S8S 



Slate of Public Affairs in October, 1806. [Nov. 1, 



trufled bv his Majcfty with this communica- 

 tion. StL"ps were thereupon taken by his 

 Majefty tbi jptning a regular ncgociatina by 

 miniftes'S duly authorized, in order to afcer- 

 tain, in a manner the moll fatisfadlory and 

 .authentic, wtiether peace could be obtjin'.-d 

 on tern.s honourable to the King and his al- 

 lies, and confifleiit with the jjeneral fecurity 

 of Europe. 



During thefe proceedings, a fninifter, fent 

 by the jlmperor of Ruflia to treat fertile fame 

 jnipcitdnt object, in concert with his Ma- 

 jeftj's government, was induced, by the 

 irlihcos of llie enemy, to fign a feparate 

 treaty,' on terms equally repugnant to tlie 

 honour and intcrefts of his Imperial Majefty. 



Unmoved by this unexpedlcd event, the 

 King continued to negotiate precifely on the 

 f.ime priijciples as before. He relied, with a 

 cor;lidenee which experience has amply jufti- 

 fied, on the good faith and fteadinefs of an 

 ally, in concert v.ith whom he had begun 

 tq ueat, and whofe intercfts he hud main, 

 tallied throughout with tlie fanne nrransfs as 

 his ^^'n. 



The French government, on the contrary, 

 elated by this advantage, of which it boaftcd 

 as equal in importance to the molt decifive 

 vicloiy, di-pjried in every conference more 

 and mure v. lu.ily from its own offers and en- 

 gagements. Kot only did it ,tal« upon itfelf 

 to change at its own will the bafis of the 

 negotiation with Great Britain, but it vio- 

 lated, in points ftiU more important, every 

 principle of good faith with Rullia. Tlie 

 thief inducement offered tft that power as 

 t!ie price of all tlie fjcriliccs extorted from 

 ]icr minifter, had been the prefervaiion of 

 Germany. Yet, before thedecifiun of Rullia 

 on this treaty could be known, France had 

 already annihilated the whole rrame and coii- 

 ilitution of tlie Cjerman empire ; had reduced 

 under her own yoke a large proportion of the 

 ftates and provinces of Germany j and, not 

 content with this open contempt of obliga- 

 tions fo recently contrailed, had at the fame 

 time inftigatcd the Porti." to meafures direiSly 

 lubverfiveof her fublifting engagements with 

 JS-u.Tki. 



While fuch condudl was purfued towards 

 his Majeily, towards his allies, and towards 

 all independent powers, there- appeared fo 

 Jittle hope of any favourable ilTue to trie ne- 

 fociatinn, that his ^lajefly's plenipotenti- 

 piies demanded their paflportS to return to 

 England. 



This demand w.ns at lirft eluded bv an un- 

 ufual and unexiilained delay, and the French 

 governm.ent afterwards, by fome material 

 conccfTions, accompanied with intimations 

 that others of ftill greater confcquence might 

 be the nfult of further dlfculfioii, procured 

 a renewal of the conferences, which were 

 protracted from day to day, till at length 

 it was announced at Pnris that the Emperor 

 rf Ruflia had indigijantly rejeflcd the unau- 

 moriicd and fcpaiate y«aly I'lgijed by his 

 »)ii4ftt;r. 



In confequcnce of this important eventj 

 thz ftrongeil alTurances were given to hi» 

 Majefty's minifter, that France was now pre- 

 pared to make I'lcrifices to a great extent, 

 in order, by fecuring peace witii Great Bri- 

 tain, to re-cftablilh the tranquillity of the 

 woi Id. 



The object of tliefe aflurances appeared, 

 however, to be, that of engaging his Ma- 

 jefty in a feparate negotiation, to the exclu- 

 fion of his allies ; a propofal which his Ma- 

 jefty had rcjecleJ in the outfet, and which' 

 he could ftiU lefs admit •f at a time when 

 the conduct of Ruffia had impofcd on him 

 an increafed obligation not to feparate his in- 

 terefts from thole of fo faitliful an ally. To 

 thefe infidijus overtures, his Majefty fteadily 

 refufed to liilen ; but he took the molt ef- 

 fe(5tual method to avoid al! appearance of 

 delay, and to accelerate, if polilbie, the fa- 

 vourable iiTue of the negociation. The con- 

 fidential intercouri'e which lie had conftantly 

 maintained with RuiTia, enabled his Majefty 

 to fpecily the terms 0,1 which peace with that 

 power might be obtained ; and his minifter 

 was accordingly inftruded to ftate to France, 

 in addition to his own demands, thofe of his 

 ally, to reduce them into diftiott guides, 

 and even to conclude on thofe grounds a pror 

 vifional treaty, to take effeft whenever Ruf.^ 

 fia ihould fignify her accellion. 



This form of negotiating was, after fotTM 

 objeflion, acceded to by France. Terms 

 were now offered to his Majefty more nearly 

 approaching than befoie to tne original bafu 

 of negotiation ; but thefe were ftill far fhort 

 of what his Majefty had uni.ormly infifted 

 on, and was now more than ever entitled to 

 e,\pert ; and the decifive rejc£hion of the 

 juft demands of Rulii.1, as well as of the 

 conditions piopofed by his Majefty in behalf 

 of his other allies, left to his Majefty no 

 other coiufe than that of ordering his minif- 

 ter to terminate the difcuflion and return to 

 Kngland. 



The foregoing fhort and fimpjc expofitlon 

 of faiSs ftands in need of no comment. The 

 firft overture:, which led to negociation were 

 made by the enemy, and they were accepted 

 by his Majeify in the fincereft fpirit «'" peace. 

 Every opening v/liich feemed to afford the 

 moft diitant profpedt of accommodation has 

 been anxioufly embraced, nor was the nego- 

 ciation finally broken off while any hope of a 

 favourable iffue could be entertained. His 

 Majefty's demands were uniformly juft and 

 reafonable^ direilcd to no oi.jeCts of pcrfonal 

 aggrandizement, but to fuch only as were 

 indifpenfubly required by the honour of his 

 crown, his engagem<ents to his allies, and a 

 due confideration of the general intcrefts of 

 Europe. 



It is with heartfelt concern that his Ma- 

 jefty contempl.ites the continuance of thofa 

 evils always infeparable from a ftate of war j 

 but it is with his enemies that this awful 

 refponfiuility rtfts ; and for the ilVuc of the 

 cunteft his Majcity tHjiis, with •o»ftd«nce, 



to 



