PKESIDENt's address — SECTION J. 257 



away. If, then, mind is powerless to effect anything, why does it not 

 vanish incontinently ? On the contrary, it persists and flourishes, 

 growing more complex with the increasing complexity of the organism, 

 as if, instead of being an idle pretender, it really had some service to 

 perform. It would appear, indeed, that consciousness varies greatly 

 in its relations to the organism. There are many organic functions 

 which, in their normal working, arouse no consciousness, and over 

 which the mind exerts no voluntary control. There are habits, such as 

 walking, which after being consciously acquired become semi-automatic, 

 and are attended to only at intervals. Some organic movements — 

 such as breathing, coughing, winking, — are apparently subject to 

 voluntary modification, though they cannot be entirely controlled. 

 And again, there are movements which are performed with clear con- 

 sciousness and deliberation, with the full consent of the performer and 

 apparently in obedience to will. Recent experiments have been held 

 to show that the energy expended in various ways by the body can be 

 measured, and that it bears an exact equivalence to the food supplied. 

 This mechanical equivalence is only what might have been expected. 

 But it will scarcely be maintained that, in a free comitry, the voluntary 

 consent of the subject who submits to be experimented upon is not 

 essential to such an experiment. It certainly does appear, in the case 

 of our voluntary movements, that the mind may, to some limited 

 extent, direct the activities of the organism, even though it may add 

 no jot or tittle to the sum total of physical energy. And the general 

 rule may be laid dowm, in accordance with the Darwinian theory, that 

 this control is possible only in so far as it may be serviceable to the 

 organism. (7) From day to day we regulate our lives on the assumptions 

 that organic stimuli may excite sensations in our minds, and, further, 

 that the mind is active in the control of conduct and of its manifesta- 

 tions in bodily movements. 



A typical illustration of the position which must be taken by the 

 consistent materialist is given in Lange's " History of Materialism." 

 A merchant is sitting comfortably in his easy chair, when a servant 

 enters with a telegram announcing that a big firm has failed. The 

 merchant orders his carriage, springs to his feet, gives instructions, 

 dictates letters, sends telegrams, then visits the bank, the exchange, 

 his business friends, and before the hour is over throws himself again 

 into his easy chair with a sigh, " Thank heaven, I have provided against 

 the worst." Now, the problem for the materialist is, as Lange says, to 

 trace back the physical series of causes through the brain to the first 

 occasion of the whole sudden movement, without any regard to the so- 

 called consciousness. He must treat the feelings, ideas, and volitions 

 that have passed through the merchant's mind as inactive accompani- 

 ments of physical phenomena. He must limit his consideration to 

 the nervous message sent from the retina to the brain, and the nervous 

 impulses which have produced, in response, words of command and all 



ij) " No activity that leaves some trace of its performance behind it is strictly 

 and wholly removed from the possible control of the will." — Professor J. 

 Jastrow — " The Subconscious," p. 36. 

 B 



