peesident's address— section J. 261 



worlds are supposed to have been formed. " If so," he asks, " had 

 we not better recast our definitions of matter and force ; for if life and 

 thought be the very flower of both, any definition which omits life and 

 thought must be inadequate, if not untrue. "(m) What is this but a 

 confession that the derivation of mind from matter, as commonly under- 

 stood, is untenable ? Or, if all that is alleged be that matter and mind 

 have alike originated from one and the same source, ^Ye are forsaking 

 the idea that mind is the product, in the last resort, of the primary 

 constituents of matter. We are asserting the existence of a primeval 

 power from which all riches of the universe, mental and material, have 

 been poured forth in the course of evolution. And, granting such a 

 power, the question arises whether this source of all things is unknow- 

 a,ble, or Divine and knowable in part. With such questions before us, 

 we have risen above the level of materialism. 



If matter be understood in the usual sense, as consisting of things 

 like those which we see and touch and handle, it may be asked if we 

 have any right to assert its existence, save in relation to mind. So 

 far I have followed the customary usage in speaking of mind and matter 

 as different orders of facts ; and undoubtedly there must be a difierence 

 betweeii siich facts as perception or memory and any material changes 

 within or without the bodily organism. But a deeper analysis, drawn 

 from the theory of knowledge, may convince us that the material world 

 is meaningless apart from mind, and can be known only in relation to 

 sentience and thought. We speak of the sensible qualities of material 

 things — as color, taste, odor, or resistance ; but it is the mind which 

 is sentient, and to ascribe such qualities to material things is devoid of 

 meaning, unless Avith reference to the truth that the mind can and does 

 experience such sensations. Again, it is through the combining activity 

 of intelligence, in accordance with the principle of uniformity, that we 

 build up our percepts, blending presentative and representative elements 

 and becoming aware of material objects in space. Without this mental 

 construction we should be conscious only of fleeting sensations, and the 

 distinction between mental and material facts would be impossible. 

 And further, in the very fact of perception, material things become 

 objects for a subject or knowing mind. We may indeed speak of matter 

 in abstraction from mind ; but it is a common fallacy to suppose that 

 things which may be spoken and thought of separately have therefore 

 a separate existence. For us, at least, matter has no existence except 

 as related to mind, and we have no right to represent matter as an in- 

 dependent reality of which our minds are merely the effects. 



The assumption that mechanical causation is a universal solvent 

 is easily understood. It has done yeoman's service in scientific in- 

 vestigation—both in the sphere of the inorganic and of the organic; 

 for it is thoroughly legitimate to regard even a living organism as a 

 machine, and to endeavor to explain all its parts and functions on the 

 principle of mechanical change. It is only a step to the assumption 

 that mechanical causation is adequate to all our investigations, and 

 that the introduction of anv other principle involves the sacrifice of 



(m) lb., II., p. 90. 



