1823.] Political Affairs in April. 



was not likely (o be allendctl with liaries in Spain 

 advantage. The Aililrcss proceedcil to 

 slate, lliat it appeared lo the House, that 

 the French King, had, in violation of the 

 rights of independent nations, attacked 

 S>pain, while the Uriiisli Ministers sncjgest- 

 ed to tlie Spauisli people the propriety 

 of making sueh alterations in the Consti- 

 tution of their conntry as France required, 

 the same Ministers having manifested, 

 in the course of their ncgociations, more 

 solicitude to obtain advantages for France 

 than for Spain. That on a review of 

 the whole conduct of the French Govern- 

 ment, the House were of opinion that 

 no relianci- could be placed in her good 

 faith, and that tiie object of her policy 

 was to obtain an ascendancy over Spain, 

 which it was the nitention of so many 

 treaties to prevent. Havini; marked their 

 strong disap.probation of the whole pro- 

 ceedings of onr Government, as well as 

 that of Fiance, the Address concluded 

 with expressing an opinion, that a more 

 frank and decided policy upon onr i)art, 

 if adopted in the first instance, would 

 have prevented the war. 



The Earl of Harrouby said, the real 

 question was, whether war or peace was 

 preferable at the present moment ; and 

 the loose language of the Address, if it 

 meant any thing, meant that we ought to 

 go to war, or at least to threaten war, 



as an assistance to our negociations. 

 The great question was, whether England 



was bound, in rescue of her honour and 



her interests, to go to war in the caure 



of Spain ? If the object of England 



was, as it undoubtedly was— conciliation, 



was it her business to do more than 



she did? In the years 18'iO and 18'^1, 



England publicly stated the rules which 



8lie intended should guide her conduct 



and regulate her policy. — The interposi- 

 tion of England was confined to advice 



and remonstrance, to a representation 



of the etieet vyhich the measures of 



France would have upon the interests 



of other nations. The tone which she 



held was conciliatory, but it was njuch 



more likely to produce etieet thnn hos- 

 tile language, which might give offence 



without gaming any point. England did 



not as^uule a more decided tone, because 



klie was anxious at all events to avoid a 



war; it wiis for their Loidships to say 



whether that policy was sound, or whe- 

 ther this country ought to rush into a 



war in Mipport of the Spanish Consti- 

 tution, and v^hat was called the liberty 



of Spain. What wa.s the cause of Spain? 



— their Lordships could not say with any 



thing like conlid' nee to vsliich side the 



Spuniiih Nation inclined. In a war where. 

 France would appear <in one side ami 

 England on the other, it would perhaps 

 be ditHcult to tind out which party 



would liave the greater number of uu,\i- 



373 



Divided as the Spanish ' 

 nation wa*, her peoi)le split into parties, . 

 and taking diliercut views, it would 

 surely be most unwise on the part of 

 England to take any hostile step unless 

 her own interests were deeply and imme- 

 (lialely concerned. If England were to. 

 menace France, France sure as she was 

 of the support and co-operation of the 

 other Great Powers of Europe, a tempta- i 

 tion would have been uiforded to her, 

 which liesli and blood could scarcely be 

 able to lesist. !ivery party in France, 

 even tliat party which was nio.st opposed 

 to the general views of Governurent, 

 would have exulted in the idea of a' 

 war against England — a war formidable, 

 to this country, .supported by tlie Powers 

 ot the CoiitineiU. At present, on the 

 part of Englaiui, war was not necessary, 

 was not politic, and in no view of the 

 case couid it be desirable in the eyes of 

 reflecting men. The Noble Lord bad 

 said, that France, should she succeed 

 against Spain, would next attack Portu- 

 gal, a Power which England was bound 

 by Treaty to protect; and then the 

 Noble Lord had asked, vdiat would be 

 the situation of England, if France should 

 make an attack upon Portugal? But 

 why did the Noble Lord anticipate that 

 attack? Was it not uatin-al to suppose 

 that, in the event of France succeeding, 

 against Spain, she would not be an.xioiis 

 to escape a fre^h contest, a conte."it iii 

 which she woidd have no object of in- 

 terest? but, should France take hostile 

 steps against Portugal, that country 

 would call upon England to fulfil her 

 treaties — England in such a case, not a* 

 the ally of Rcvulutionanj Goveniments( ! ! ! ) 

 but in that honourahle and necessary 

 situation in which circumstances and 

 Treaties would place her. It was to be 

 lamented that eiforts had not been made 

 to avoid hostilities between France and 

 Spain. Advice that had been given to 

 Spain to alter her Constitution, wa.s not 

 accompanied by any menace, it was not 

 given with any hostile feeling, but in the 

 hi'pe that a Constitution winch admitted 

 of so much improvement would have 

 undergone .some modification. 



Lord Holluiid said, that no noble lord in 

 that hou.se, no unprejudiced man in the 

 country, could avoid euming to the conclu- 

 sion that his INlajesty's ministers had becu 

 duped, grossly duped, in their late nego- 

 ciations with France. His great objec- 

 tion to the whole of the course pursued by 

 our government was, that from beginning 

 to end of the negociations, there appeared 

 to have been a decidetl preference given 

 to the interests of the Bourbons, to the 

 total neglect of those of our ow ii or of other 

 countries. Now he would for a moment 

 suppose Prince Metternich and Count 

 Nckiicliude uii.\iuusly couMderinj; the mean- 



