Blaquiere’s Spain and Spanish Revolution. 
own power, he may in his turn have con- 
sidered us fit objects of extermination. 
It is not indeed improbable, that his 
plan for making a more effectual ally of 
Spain, may have been suggested by a 
few historical facts connected with our 
recent history.* Ifte believed Portugal 
to be no better than a colony of Great 
Britain, there was surely nothing so very 
extraordinary or criminal in his attempt 
to wrench it from our hands, or in his 
wishing to give France the benefit of a 
closer alliance with the Peninsula, [ 
forbear entering into an examination of 
his position relative to the Bourbons, 
it is too obvious to require illustration. 
I lament in common with others, that 
instead of acting a secondary and pro- 
tective part, by suffering the people to 
work out their own political salvation 
under his auspices, Napoleon should 
have so far mistaken the national cha- 
racter as to attack its most predominant 
dogmas, Catholicism and legitimacy, 
into which, according to the Abbé de 
Pradt and others, all the virtues and 
energies of the nation were reduced pre- 
vious to the war of independence. These 
would, however, have been most probably 
insufficient to effect the work of regene- 
ration. Happily for the people, the sa- 
crifices they were called on to make, 
and the intellectual powers brought into 
play, led on to higher modes of think- 
ing, while it exposed the deformity of 
the former system, and demonstrated. the 
necessity of one more consonant with the 
principles of justice. 
It has been maintained as an addi- 
tional argument in favour of the Empe- 
ror and his brother’s title to the throne, 
that so large a party, including many of 
the most virtuous and enlightened men 
in Spain, should have espoused their 
cause with a zeal, which could only 
spring from a conviction, that the former 
were conferring the greatest benefits on 
their country. As to the constitution of 
Bayonne, though certainly not so liberal 
as that of Cadiz, especially in whatever 
related to the kingly power and forma- 
tion of Cortes, yet were most of its ar- 
ticles unexceptionable. The avowed ob- 
* It should not be forgotten, that the 
attack on Copenhagen and seizure of the 
Spanish frigates, without a previous de- 
claration of war, preceded the invasion 
of Spain. I apprehend that all the reasons 
brought forward in justification of those 
two state crimes, will only tend to aggra- 
vate their enormity in the eyes of poste- 
© vity. 
58t 
ject of Napoleon, immediately after he 
became possessed of the renunciations 
made at Bayonne, was to convene the 
Cortes, which had, it is well known, 
been suspended by the kings of the 
Austrian dynasty, and completely set 
aside during that of the Bourbons. This 
admission of a national congress, elected 
by the people, presented a sure barrier 
against arbitrary power, affording secu- 
rity to property, from the mere fact of _ 
its possessing the exclusive privilege of 
voting the supplies and imposing taxes, 
Unlike the former system, the executive 
and legislative power were to be sepa- 
rated; the judges declared independent 
of the Crown, and such other measures 
adopted as were most likely to check the 
growth, or admit the possibility of public 
abuses. 
To prove that these were not idle pro- 
mises held out to seduce the credulous, 
it is sufficient to add that the abolition 
of the holy office; appropriation of 
church lands to the payment of the 
public creditor and wants of the state ; 
sale of national domains; the formation 
of civil and criminal codes; public in- 
structions removed from those gothic 
piles in which it had been confined by 
the depraved and despotic taste of priests 
and school-men; lastly, a powerful im- 
pulse given to arts, manufactures, and 
commerce;—such and. various other 
equally salutary, were amongst the im- 
mediate results of the new government, 
though produced during the distractions 
of a rancorous war. 
With respect to the ministers of King 
Joseph, whether chosen, by himself or 
Napoleon, it would have been impossi- 
ble for the most ardent friend of Spain 
to make a more excellent selection. They 
were named at Bayonne on the 4th of 
July, 1808, and consisted of men who 
had been long distinguished for the li- 
berality of their sentiments, literary ac- 
quirements, and superior talents in all 
the branches of political knowledge, 
To substantiate this assertion, 1 need 
only mention the names of Jovellanos, 
Cabarrus, Cambronero, Llorenté, O’Far- 
ril, Azanza, Urquijo, Mazarredo, Arrivas, 
and Pignuela; most of these had filled 
very high offices under Charles IV., and 
were all more or less exposed to perse- 
cution during his reign, for their efforts 
in favour of reform. 
GREAT BRITAIN AND SPAIN. 
With respect to Spain and Great Bri- 
tain, a judicious commercial treaty is one 
of the greatest desiderata. Spain is one 
of the most agriculturally wie’: 
an 
