English themselves admit, are better 
than their’s. ‘The guns are superior in 
calibre to those of the Enclish by one- 
fourth. These are two great advantages. 
“The English are superior in discipline. 
The Toulon and Scheldt squadrons bad 
adopted the same practice and customs 
as tlie Fnetlish, and were attempting as 
severe a discipline, with the difference 
helonging to the character of the two 
nations. The English discipline is per- 
fectly slavish; it is patron and serf. It 
is only kept up by the influence of the 
most dreadful terror, Such a state of 
things would degrade and debase the 
French character, which requires a pa- 
ternal kind of discipline, more founded 
op honour and sentiment, 
In most of the battles with the English 
which we have lost, we have either 
‘been inferior in strength, or combined 
with Spanish ships, which, being ill or- 
ganized, and in these Jatter times de- 
generate, have weakened our line in- 
stead of strengthening it; or, finally, 
the. commanders-in-chief, who wished 
to fight while advancing ‘to meet the 
enemy, have wavered when they fell in 
with him, retreated under various pre- 
texts, and thus compyoniised the bravest 
men, 
A GEEEK CAPTAINS. _ 
Alexander conducted eight cam- 
paigns, during which he conquered 
Asia and part of India ; Haunibal, se- 
venteen, one in Spain, fifteen in Italy, 
and one in Africa; Cesar, thirteen, 
eight against the Gauls and five against 
Pompey’s legions; Gustavus Adolphus, 
three, one in Livonia against the Rus- 
siams, and two in Germany against the 
House of Austria ; ‘Turenne commanded 
in eighteen, nine in France, and nine in 
Germany; Prince Eugene of Savoy in 
thirteen, two against the Turks, five in 
Italy against I’rance, and six on the 
Rhine, or in Flanders; Frederic con- 
ducted cleyen, in Silesia, in Bohemia, 
and on the banks of the Elbe. The 
history of these cighty-cight campaigns, 
carefully written, would be a complete 
treatise on the art of war; the principles 
which ought to be followed in offensive 
and defensive war, would flow from it 
spontancously, 
TACTICS OF ALEXANDER. 
His mode of warfare was methodical ; 
it mevits the highest praise; none of 
his convoys were intercepted ; his armies 
constantly keptinereasing : the moment 
at which they were weakest was when 
he commenced operations at the Gra- 
nictis; by the time he appeared at the 
Montiuty Mac, No. 391. 
. during his own Reign. 
625 
Indus, hisnembers had tripled, without 
reckoning the ¢orps commanded by the 
‘governors of the conquered  proyintés, 
which were composed of invalided or 
wearied Maccdonians, recrtits sent from 
‘Greece, or drawn from the Greek troops 
in the service of the satraps, ‘or, finally, 
of foreigners raised’ amongst tlie natives 
in the country. Alexander mérits ‘the 
glory he has enjoyed for so many aves 
amongst all nations. But suppose he 
had been defeated on thé Issus, where 
the army of Darius was’ drawn up'in 
order of battle on his line ofretreat, with 
its left to the mountains, and its right to 
the sea; whilst the Macedonians had 
their right towards the mountains, their 
left towards ‘the sea, and the’ pass’ of 
Cilicia behind them! | OF stpposé he 
had been beaten at Arbella, with the 
Tigris, the Euphrates, and the Deserts 
in his rear, without fortresses, and at a 
distance of nine hundred’ leagues from 
Macedon! Oy suppose he’ had been 
vanquished by Porus when driven tothe 
Indus! L ® 
TACTICS OF HANNIBAL, 
Hannibal's principle was to keep al 
his troops in junction, to have no gar- 
rison but in a single place, which he're- 
served to himself, to hold his hostages, 
his great machines, his prisoners of dis- 
tinction, and his sick: depending on'the 
fidelity of his allies for his communica- 
tions. He maintained himself ‘sixteen 
years in Italy, without receiving any 
succours from Carthage ; and he only 
evacuated Italy by order of his go- 
vernment, to’ fly to the defence of bis 
country. Fortune betrayed him “at 
Zama, and Carthage ccased to” exist. 
But had be been vanquished at T'rebhia, 
Thrasymene, or Cann, what greater 
disasters could have happened ‘than 
those which followed the battle of Zama? 
Although defeated at the gates’ of his: 
capital, he could not save his army from 
utter destruction, ' 
OF CHSAR, 
He left the care of hiis communications 
to bis allies, having always a month’s 
provisions in his camp, and a morith’s 
provisions ‘in ‘a’ fortress, where, like 
Hannibal, he kept his hostages, maga- 
zines, and hospitals.’ On the same 
principles he conducted his seven other 
campaigns in Gaul. During this great 
contest, the whole of Czesai’s army was’ 
in his camp ; he Jeft no point vulnerable.’ 
In Cesar’s campaigns of the civil war,’ 
lie conquered by following the same! me- 
thod and the same principles, but he 
run much greater risks, He passed the 
4L Rubicon 
