628 
Napeleon's\ History ofFrance, 
In 1808 most of. the ifortresses of the'! the:capitalsfrom becoming ifatalto- tlic 
north 6f Spainy Stimt:Sebastian,“Pams! allies) » bhe of eqioo 9 
peluna,. Piguéras, and | Bareclonay were» 
in thé!power df dhe Frencli atmy when 
it narebed on Burgos.) oi ' 
1m4809! the first guns were fired near 
Ratisbon? | Augsburg was Napoleon’s 
centre ofopcrations.* ‘Phe! Austrians 
havibg razed»Braunan, he’ chose the 
fortress of Passaw; situate at the con- 
fluence ofthe Thn.and:the Danube; and 
much more advantageous, as it secured 
him’ at‘once aibridge over eachiof these 
rivers. ©! He had \it:fortified, and also se- 
cured the bridge of Lintz by works of the 
first’strength.) His army, on arriving at 
Vienna, had)independently_ of that com- 
munication on Bavaria, «a commupica- 
dion secared with Italy, by the castle of 
Gratz:and the fortified: place of Clagen- 
furthi®. 
In 1812 Dantzie, Thorn, Modlin, and 
Praga; were his places;on the Vistula? 
VeilanyKowno, Grodno, » Wilna, and 
Minsk, his mawazines near the Niemen: 
Smolesko, his grand depdt for his move- 
ment on Moskow. {nithis operation he 
hada fortified) point of appui at every 
eight days’ mareh; all the post-houses 
were ‘embattled “and intrenched; they 
were oéeupied only by one company and 
one’ piece of cannon; which so eflectu- 
ally secured the service, that during the 
whole! ‘campaign not a single estafette 
or convoy was intercepted; and that 
even during the retreat, except the four. 
days when Admiral Tchichagoff was re- 
pulsed beyond the Beresina, the commu- 
nications of the army with its places of 
depot were constantly free. 
In 1813 Konigstein, Dresden, Torgaw, 
Wittemburg, Magdeburg, and Hamburg, 
were his places on the Hlbe ;) Mersburg, 
Erfurthy!aud'Wurtzburg, his echelons 
for reaching’ the Rhine. on 
In the'campaign. of 1814 he had for- 
tresses in‘all directions ; and the fall im- 
portance ‘of ‘those of ‘Flanders would 
have been seen, if Paris had not been 
given up by treachery; or even if, alter: 
its fall, the defection of the: sixth corps 
d’armée'to the enemy had not prevented 
Napoleon from marching'on Paris: the 
allies would have been forced to abandon 
the capital,! for ‘sorely their generals 
would neverhavecrisked-a battle on the 
left bank of the Seine, with that great 
city in their tear,’ which they had only, 
occupied for thtee days) The treachery 
of several ministers /and civil agents faci- 
litated the'entrance of ‘the: enemy ‘into 
Paris, but it was that of amarshal which 
prevented the momentary ovctpation ‘of 
mo Dasamo0g 1} 
The: plans’ of /all Napoleon's fourteen’: 
campaigis are \conformabletoithe trues 
principles (of war; his wars ‘were bold,’ 
but methodical 3:nothing: can be!/more!’ 
satisfactorily proved than ‘this: is) by the!’ 
defence of the Adige in 1796; when ithe: 
House of) Austria Jost \several: armies): 
and by that of the Passarge in 1807, to" 
protect the siege of Dantzics) 8 on: 
GREAT PRINCIPLES. 15) 
Unity of command: is of the mtmos 
importance in war. | Two-armies ought’ 
never to be placed on the same'scene'of: 
action.. Modern troops haye'\1o0"' more 
occasion for bread and “biscuit: than the 
Romans had: give then flour, ri¢ey:or’ 
pulse, on their marches,’ and they will 
take no harm. It is an error to suppose 
that the generals of antiquity did not pay 
great attention to- their magazines 2\it 
may be seen in Cesar’s ‘Commentaries, 
how much he was ‘occupied. by this care’ 
in several campaigns. ‘hey badvonly; 
discovered the art of not! being slaves to» 
it; and of not being obliged to dependon' 
their purveyors; und ‘this oart/has been! 
understood by all our great captains, 
The system followed. ‘by ‘the! Prenehony 
the war of Hanover; (was) the art col 
getting great: armies beaten» by small: 
ones, and of doing nothing with immense’ 
means. auld ti 
Generals-in-chief are guided by their: 
own experience, or their genius. 'Tac-' 
tics, evolutions, the science of tho-en+) 
gincer and the artillery-oflicer, maybe» 
learned from treatises, much inthe! samer 
way as gcometry; but the knowledgeof; 
the higher branches of the art: of :war is’ 
only to be gained by experience, andiby 
studying the history of the warsiand- bat+ 
tles of great leaders. | Cany one learn in’ 
a grammar to’! compose a book of the: 
Tliad, or one of Corneille’s'tragedies?\ ’ 
HIS ARMIES. ud olde 
The maximum of) the numberof 
troops which Napoleoti: ever: hadvon; 
foot is 600,000 men’ The population of. 
his empire was above’ forty millions of 
souls; double the population of Hrance 
under Louis: X}V. who: Jong kept 
400,000 soldicrs in pay! It! wonld be’an 
extraordinary:mistake to imagine that .alb 
the: conscriptidns «decreed> were! aciu- 
ally levied ; these ‘decrees -wetee strata 
gems of war employed to: deceive foe) 
reigners|;: they: were\used as'a sonrée off 
power, and) it) was ‘the constant sadtie+ 
rence to this system whith always made. 
people think: the Preuch armies: more 
numerous than they actually were. <1.) 
In 
