_ during his own. Reign. 
~ef hostile country;! that, is.to'say, Mus- 
-eovy, Smolenskoowas taken and armed, 
dand becume the pivot of the march on 
Moscow.* Hospitals for 3000 men were 
‘established there, with magazines of mi- 
itary’ stores, which contained more than 
250,000 cartridges for cannon, and con- 
siderable supplies of clothing and pro- 
visions. Between the Vistula and the 
Boristhenes 240,000 men were left; 
160,000 only passed the bridge of Smo- 
Jensko; to march on Moscow, Ofthese, 
40,000 remained to guard the magazines, 
hospitals, and depéts of Dorogholowy, 
Viazma, Ghjot, and Mozajsk ; 100,000 
etitered Moscow ; and 20,000 bad been 
killed in the march and in the great bat- 
tle of the Moskowa, in which 50,000 
Rassians perished. 
‘The French might have adopted the 
plan’ of marching on St. Petersburg; 
the court was apprehensive of this, and 
had’sent its archivesand most valuable 
treasures to London; it had also directed 
Admiral 'Pchitchagoff’s army to cover 
that eapital.. Considering that it is as 
far from Moscow to St. Petersburg, 
as from Smolensko to St. Petersburg, 
Napoleon preferred going to pass the 
winter at Smolensko, on the bord@rs of 
Lithuania, reserving his march on St, 
Petersburg to the spring. He com- 
menced his movement on Smolensko, by 
again attacking and defeating Kutusofl’s 
army at + Malsioroslawitz, whence he 
continued it, unimpeded, until the ice, 
the snow, and the cold, killed 30,000 
horses in one night, and obliged the 
army to abandon the waggons, which 
caused the calamities of that march; 
for it ought not to be called a retreat, 
since’ the army was victorious, and 
could equally well have marched on St. 
Petersburg, Kalouga, or Toula, which 
Kutnsoff would in vain have attempted 
1é' Cover. The army would have 
wintered at Smolensko, if Prinee 
Seliwartzenburg had not abandoned it, 
and manveuvred on Warsaw, which al- 
lowed Admiral Vchitehagolf to proeeed 
tothe Beresina, and to menace the 
and magazines and depds of Wilna, 
where there were provisions for the 
army {or four months, clothing for 
50,000.men, borses, ainmunition, and a 
division 6f' 10,000 mento guard them, 
Genetal Dombrowski, who oeenpied the 
fort of Borisow and the ‘bridge: of the 
Boresina, could not defend theny: he 
had! only (9000 men, and was? dist! 
lodged.) “Admiral Vehiteliagoff passed! 
the Beresiva fo proceed oti the’ Dwina,’ 
but attempted nothiog against Wilna 5 
631 
‘he was met by the Duke of Reggio, 
wlio defeated him, and drove him back 
on the Beresinz, after having taken ‘all 
his baggage. In his consternation, the 
admiral ‘burnt the brid¢e of Borisow. 
Had it been August instead of No- 
vember, the army would have marched 
on St. Petersburg; it was retiring on 
Smolensko, not because it was beaten, 
but for the purpose of wintering in 
Poland; had it been summer, neither 
Admiral Tchitchagofi’s army, nor that 
of Kutusoff, would have dared to ap- 
proach within ten days’ march of the 
French army, en pain of immediate 
destruction. 
RETURN TO PARIS. 
Within two days’ march of Wilia, 
ihe army having no farther dangers. to 
encounter, the emperor conceived that 
the urgency of affairs required his pre- 
sence in Paris; it was there only that 
he could dictate to Prussia and Austria : 
if he bad delayed proceeding thither, 
the passage might have been closed 
against him. He left the king of Naples 
and the Prince of Neuchatel in com- 
mand of thearmy. ‘Ibe guard was then 
entire, and the army contained more 
than 80,000 combatants, exclusively of 
the Duke of Tarento’s corps, which was 
on the Dwina. The Russian army, at the 
utmost, did not now exceed 50,000 men. 
Flour, biscuits, wine, meat, dried pulse, 
and forage, abounded at. Wilna. Ac- 
cording to the report of the state of the 
stores of provisions, presented to the 
emperor on his passage through that 
city, there then remained’ four millions 
of rations of flour, three millions six 
hundred thousand rations of meat, nine 
million rations of wine or brandy’; con- 
siderable .mayazines of .clothing’ and 
other articles, as well as of ammunition, 
had likewise been formed): ‘Had the’ 
emperor remained. with the army, or 
delegated the command. ‘to’ Prince 
Eugene, it would never have passed 
beyond Wilna: there was: avecorps of 
reserve, at.-Warsaw and ‘another at 
Koenigsburg ;. butia few cossacks inti- 
midated the commaniters ;\Wilna was 
eyacuated by nightav adisorderly man- 
ner! itis from) this: period in: particular 
that the great losses of this campaign 
may ibe dated; and it'wassone of the 
misfortunes of the statevof aflairsat that 
times tidt theemperor was, imall great 
and evitical cir¢umstanees, reqnired to 
berwith the army and at Paris at the 
same time.» Nothivg was, or could be, 
more totally unforescen by him than the 
senseless 
