Mr. H. T. CoLEBROOKE on the Philosophy of the Hhidus. -29 



tion only, and the Fats' eshicas, who disallow tradition, are rejected as insuffi- 

 cient authorities.* 



Inference is of three sorts, equally admitted by the schools of the S'dnc'hi/a 

 and Gotama's Nydya ; and in all distinguished by the same denominations. 

 The consideration of them more properly belongs to the dialectic philosophy, 

 than to this ; and may therefore be postponed. It will be here sufficient to 

 state the simplest explanation furnished by scholiasts of the Carted and 

 Sutras, without going into the differences which occur in their expositions. 



One sort, then, is the inference of an effect from a cause : the second is 

 that of a cause from an effect ; the third is deduced from a relation otnei 

 than that of cause and effect. Examples of them are, 1st, rain anticipated 

 from a cloud seen gathering. 2d. Fire concluded on a hill, whence smoke 

 ascends. 3d. A flower's appropriate colour presumed where its peculiar 

 scent is noticed ; or motion of the moon's orb, deduced from observation of 

 it in different aspects ; or saltness of the sea, concluded from that of a sam- 

 ple of sea water ; or bloom surmised on mangoe-trees in general, when an 

 individual mangoe tree is found in blossom. 



In regard to the third kind of evidence, tradition or right affirmation,! 

 explained as intending true revelation,t commentators understand it to mean 

 the Vedas or sacred writ, including the recollections of those gifted mortals, 

 who remember passages of their former lives, and call to mind events which 

 occurred to them in other worlds ; and excluding, on the other hand, pre- 

 tended revelations of impostors and barbarians. 



In a dialogue cited from the Vedas, one of the interlocutors, the holy 

 Jaigishavya, asserts his presence, and consequent recollection of occur- 

 rences, through ten renovations of the universe ("MahasargaJ. 



In a more extended sense, this third kind of evidence is the affirmation of 

 any truth ; and comprises every mode of oral information or verbal commu- 

 nication, whence knowledge of a truth may be drawn. 



From these three sources, by the right exercise of judgment and due 

 application of reasoning, true knowledge is derived ; consisting in a discri- 

 minative acquaintance with principles : which, in the Su?i'chya system, are 

 reckoned to be not less than twenty-five ; vis;. 



* Com. on Car. 5. f Pat. 1.7. t Car. 4, and 5. 



