96 Mr. H. T. Colebrooke on the Philosophy of the H'mdus. 



sequent, antecedent, and analogous) ; comparison, and affirmation (com- 

 prehending tradition, as well as revelation). Inference a ^noW concludes 

 an effect from its cause ; inference d posteriori deduces a cause from its 

 effect : another ground of inference is analogy. Or one sort is direct and 

 affirmative ; another indirect or negative ; and the third is both direct and 

 indirect. 



Proof {pramdna) is defined to be the efficient or especial cause of actual 

 knowledge : and this intends right notion {anubhava) ; exclusive, conse- 

 quently, of wrong notion, as error, doubt, and reduction to absurdity ; and 

 likewise exclusive of memory: for notion {anubhaVa) is knowledge other 

 than remembrance. 



Cause {cdrana) is that which is efficacious, necessarily preceding an effect 

 that cannot else be : and, conversely, effect (cdryd) is that which necessarily 

 ensues and could not else be. 



For the relation of cause and effect, and for distinguishing different sorts 

 of cause, connexion (^sambandhd) or relation, in general, must be considered. 

 It is two-fold : simple conjunction (safij/oga), and aggregation or intimate 

 and constant relation (samavdi/a) ; the latter being the connexion of things, 

 whereof one, so long as they coexist, continues united with the other : for 

 example, parts and that which is composed of them ; as yarn and cloth : 

 for so long as the yarn subsists, the cloth remains. Here the connexion of 

 the yarn and cloth is intimate relation : but that of the loom is simple con- 

 junction. Consonantly to this distinction, cause is intimate or direct, pro- 

 ducing aggregation or an intimately relative effect, as clay of pottery, or 

 yarn of cloth : or it is mediate or indirect, being proximate to the aggre- 

 gating cause, as conjunction of yarn serving for the production of cloth : 

 or thirdly, it is neither direct nor indirect, but instrumental or concomitant, 

 as the loom. Of positive things there must be three causes; and the most 

 efficacious is termed the chief or especial cause : of negative there is but 

 one, which is the third abovementioned. 



This would be the place for an ample discussion of the several sorts of 

 proof abovementioned. But they are topics embracing too great a scope of 

 disquisition in the Hindu philosophy, to be adequately considered within 

 the limits of the present essay. The subject, therefore, is reserved for future 

 consideration, in a connected view of it, with relation to the various Indian 

 systems of philosophising, after they shall have been severally examined. 



