Mr. CoLEBROOKE oti the Philosophy of Indian Sectaries. 563 



decay. Their dissolution is {marana) death. Regret of a dying person is 

 {soca') grief. Wailing is {paridevandL) lamentation. Experience of that 

 which is disagreeable is (duhc'hd) pain or bodily sufferance. But mental 

 pain is (daurmanasi/a) discomposure of mind. Upon death ensues departure 

 to another world. That is followed by return to this world. And the course 

 of error, with its train of consequences, recommences.* 



Besides these matters, which have a real existence but momentary dura- 

 tion, the Bauddhas distinguish under the category and name of {nirupa') 

 unreal, false, or non-existent, three topics : 1st, wilful and observable 

 destruction (^pratisaiK'hya-nirddha) of an existent thing, as the breaking of 

 a jar by a stroke of a mallet ; 2d, unobserved nullity or annihilation {apra- 

 tisane' hi) a-nirodhd) ; and 3d, vacancy or space (dcds'a) unencompassed and 

 unshielded, or the imaginary ethereal element. 



The whole of this doctrine is formally refuted by the Veddntins. ' The 

 entire aggregate, referred to two sources, external and internal, cannot be ; 

 nor the word's course dependent thereon : for the members of it are in- 

 sensible ; and its very existence is made to depend on the flash of thought ; 

 yet no other thinking permanent being is acknowledged, accumulating that 

 aggregate, directing it, or enjoying; nor is there an inducement to activity 

 without a purpose, and merely momentary. 



' Nor is the alleged concatenation of events admissible : for there is no 

 reason of it. Their existence depends on that of the aggregate of which 

 they are alleged to be severally causes. The objections to the notion of 

 eternal atoms with beings to enjoy, are yet more forcible against momentary 

 atoms with none to enjoy. The various matters enumerated as successive 

 causes, do not account for the sum of sensible objects. Nor can they, 

 being but momentary, be the causes of effects : for the moment of the one's 

 duration has ceased, before that of the other's existence commences. Being 

 then a non-entity, it can be no cause. Nor does one last till the other 

 begins, for then they would be contemporaneous. 



' The ethereal element (dcds'a) is not a non-entity : for its existence is 

 inferrible from sound. 



' Nor is self or soul momentary : memory and recollection prove it : and 

 there is no doubt nor error herein ; for the individual is conscious that he is 

 the same who to-day remembers what he yesterday saw. 



• S'anc. Vach., &c. on Br. Sutr. 2. 2. (s. 19.) 

 4 D 2 



