1825.] On.the Non-Eternity of the World. a, 405 
Very little assistance, in this path, is to be expected from those who, after having been 
metaphysical in their poetry, become poetical in their metaphysics, and would atone by 
their flourishes in the latter for the abstraction of the former, * 
In this respect, our Correspondent, “ The Inquirer,”’ seems to have treated his sub- 
ject fairly: he has given his reasonings in their simple nakedness. It is for the reader 
to examine their validity and conclusiveness. 
With respect to the commentator, the notes he has deemed it proper to subjoin seem 
to have reference to the logic, rather than to the doctrine; and it is not to be taken for 
granted that, wherever he disputes the validity of the reasoning, he disallows the doctrine. 
The conclusion would be no fair induction, even, if the differences were much wider than 
they are, for, the doctrine we agree with may be weakly, and that which we dissent from ma 
be powerfully, sustained :—an axiom which (though not applicable in the present ‘nmtant) 
should never be forgotten, by those who look to controversial reasoning for the test of 
truth. Mastery, in argument, is no demonstration of what ought to be trowed, any more 
than trial by combat is a test of what ought to be held legally just. Victory, in either 
case, may depend upon the comparative strength and skill of the combatants; as the 
real balance of a disputed account may be in favour of him who has not arithmetic 
enough to detect the false calculations by which the more subtle litigant may have con- 
trived to embarrass the statements. The reader, therefore, should examine for himself 
the pro and con, wherever he finds any controversy ; and should argue the matter with 
his own mind—indepené¢ently : as he should, also, the grounds upon which the commen- 
tator pushes the argument still further, and, from the individuality of a world, extends 
his inquiry to universal matter. 
But we have said, perhaps, more than enough. We leave the Inquirer and the Com- 
mentator to speak for themselves. ——Epiror. 
* Such, however, is frequently the case with minds of very extraordinary endowments, 
and equally extraordinary attainments: but they are endowments in chaos—acquisitions 
in wreck and disorder. The faculties are jumbled together, and become scattered 
with like confusion over every subject ; and, with all their vastness and their splendour, 
are of no more use to those who appeal to them, than the prostrate ruins of some mag- 
nificent edifice, to those who seek protection from the inclemencies of the elements. 
1 HATEVER has existed from 
P eternity, must have existed 
of itself, not by means of another; for 
nothing could exist before it from which 
it could receive its being. 
2. Every thing, therefore, that has 
existed from eternity, must be self-ex- 
istent. . On the other hand, whatever is 
self-existent must have existed from 
eternity. 
3. For if it have not, there must have 
been a time when it began to be; and, 
if so, then something without itself 
gave it beginning; for, if something 
without itself did not give it beginning, 
then something within must; and one 
part must have existed in consequence 
of another—which, in a self-existent 
being, is impossible. (a) 
4. I say, impossible ; for, whatever is 
self-existent cannot be divided into 
parts, or, which is the same thing, is not 
divisible ; for, if it were, then it behoved 
every part to be self-existent : (4) and, 
as every thing that is divisible may be 
diyided ad infinitum, we should then 
have an infinite number of self-existent 
beings, which is equally impossible. 
5. For, if any thing exist of itself, 
there can be nothing else to control 
its existence, or, what is the same thing, 
it must be superior to every thing else ; 
and, consequently, omnipotent—seeing 
a superiority to every thing else is all 
we mean by omnipotence. (ce) 
‘6. But there cannot be two omnipo- 
tent beings; because, either they would 
agree in every respect, and conse- 
quently be one and the same, which 
is absurd; or they would differ, and 
then each would oppose and annihilate 
the power of each, which is inconsis- 
tent with omnipotence. 
7. There is, therefore, only one self- 
existent being, and that being has been 
demonstrated to be omnipotent, eter- 
nal, indivisible, and, consequently, im- 
material. 
8. The visible world, however, is 
material, and divisible; it is, therefore, 
not self-existent, and, consequently, has 
not existed from eternity. (d) 
9. But the world may be further 
proved not to be self-existent ; for all 
the parts of it are produced in succes- 
sion, by some previous external cause: 
now, if all the parts be the effect of 
some external cause, the whole must 
be the effect of an external cause; 
for what may be said of all the parts, 
may, also, be said of the whole. 
That all the parts, however, are the 
effects of an external cause, appears 
from this—that, in the animal kingdom, 
no 
