406 
no son can exist without a father; in 
the vegetable, no plant without a seed ; 
and, in the mineral, no stone without 
a collection of the requisite compo- 
nent parts. 
Should it be said, that these are not 
properly new existences, but only 
changes and modifications of matter,— 
I ask, whence do these changes arise— 
from themselves, or from another ? 
Does that particular modification of 
matter, the body of man, exist by his 
own will, or his own command? Does 
it not rather begin to be—continue to 
be—and cease to be—not only without 
his will, but by means of which he is 
ignorant, which are at once external 
to him, and independent of him ? 
If then man cannot produce even this 
change, or modification, with respect 
to his own body, much less can he 
create, or produee the materials of 
which it is formed. 
But, if man can do neither of these, 
much less can the other parts of the 
universe; inasmuch as he is superior to 
all the other parts with which we are 
acquainted. 
But, if all the parts of the universe 
are thus changed and produced, inde- 
‘pendent of themselves, the same must 
be true of the whole. 
Ergo :—the uniyerse is not self-ex- 
istent—but the effect of some external 
cause; and, as every effect necessarily 
exists posterior to its cause, it follows, 
that it cannot have existed from eter- 
nity. 
Again, whatever is self-existent, must 
mecessarily be independent of all other 
things for the continuance of its exis- 
tence. 
But every thing in the universe is 
dependent on something without itself 
for the continuance of its existence. 
‘Thus, for example, the inhabitants of 
‘the earth depend on it for a supply of 
nourishment, as well as upon the other 
elements for things essential to life; and 
they cease to exist, at least, in a certain 
form, as soon as these are denied. The 
“earth itself depends on the other planets 
for the place it holds in the universe ; 
and the whole system is held together 
‘by an attractive power, which operates, 
from without, on every part of it, which 
is unknown to it, and independent of it. 
If, then, the universe is not indepen- 
dent, with respect to the continuance 
of its form and place, much less will it 
be so with respect to the continuance 
of its existence: and, if it be not inde- 
pendent with respect to the continu- 
On the Non-Eternity of the World. 
[Dec. 1, 
ance of its existence, much less will it 
be so with respect to existence itself: 
and if not independent with respect 
to existence itself—it cafmot be self- 
existent; and, if it is not self-exis- 
tent, it follows, from what was demon- 
strated above, that it cannot have ex- 
isted from eternity. 
ComMENTATOR’s OBSERVATIONS. 
3.(a) The first and second clauses 
seem to be postulates that are evidently 
unquestionable. This third might be 
equally’so, but that there seems to be 
something unguarded, or, at least, pre- 
mature, in the affirmation that it is 
impossible that one part of an eternal 
being should have existed in conse- 
quence of another part. The question 
of infinitude, as opposed to space or 
boundary, it should be remembered, 
has not yet been considered; and, bar- 
ring this suggestion, there does not 
seem any actual impossibility in the 
idea of an eternally self-existent being* 
emanating new parts, or possessing the 
power of self-multiplication. It may be 
questioned, also, whether this argument 
does not, in one respect, go further 
than the author intends (this, however, 
would be no impeachment of its vali- 
dity—he who seeks for abstract truth’ 
must not be startled at what are called 
consequences !)—whether it might not 
form a link in the chain of induction to~- 
prove the eternity of matter also, But 
of this hereafter. : 
4, (b) No: not self-existent as a part ; 
but a part of the self-existent. Deny the 
eternity of matter, and it is more diffi- 
cult to get over the proposition that 
the world itself, and all the worlds, are 
part of the self-existent.t If matter 
emanated from deity, it is, or was, a 
part of deity: for that which emanates 
from must have pertained to—must 
have been a part of that from whence 
it emanated. Extend the mathematical 
dictum that follows in this clause to 
infinitude of expanse—nay, confine it to 
eternity of duration—and see the inex- 
tricable difficulties in which all ques- 
tions 
* Tstent, if we had such a word, we 
ought to say—for it is difficult to conceive, 
unless we mean to deny his infinitude, how 
the particle ex can be any way applied to 
deity. 
+ Let it not be forgotten that the ques- 
tion of the eternity or non-eternity of 
matter does not necessarily involve the 
question of the creation or non-creation of 
any given world, or system of worlds. 
