536 
have been a part of the Deity—it must 
have been one part existing in conse- 
quence of another, 
Before matter existed, then we say, 
there must have been a possibility of its 
xistence, and if so, there must have 
sen a power requisite for its production 
_ ez nihilo, or it never could have been 
produced; and if there was a power, 
then the eternally self-existent being 
who possesses “ all the power that is,” 
must have possessed such power. 
_ If parts in infinitude be admitted, or 
if ivfinitude be divisible, then must 
every part be equal to the whole, and 
the whole no bigger than a part. It is 
absurd to speak of an infinitive, although 
prospectivelyor retrospectively ; because, 
if there is any determinate sense in 
language, the term infinite must be 
understood to mean—illimitable—with- 
out bounds. If matter is infinite, it 
cannot admit of augmentation, and if it 
be finite, it cannot possess any infinite 
attributes—which it must have if it be 
infinitely divinable or extensible. So 
that if we want to speak of that capa- 
city which appears to belong to matter 
of division and extension, without any 
conceivable, and we must use other 
terms to express our ideas than such 
as are demonstrably contradictory, we 
may say with propriety, that matter is 
indefinitely divisably and augmentable, 
but not that it is infinitely so. For if 
matter possess infinite attributes, then as 
what is true of the whole is true also 
of every detached part, we must have 
an indefinite number of infinites, indeed 
—infinity multiplied by infinity! It is 
contradictory to speak of an actually 
existing infinite number ; yet, if the par- 
ticles of matter admit of being counted, 
_we must have such in the supposition, 
that matter is eternal. Hartly saw this, 
aud opposed to it, as equally difficult to 
get Over, that to suppose matter finite 
is to suppose a stop where the mind 
Strictures on “ The Non-Eternity of the World.” 
cannot rest : we ‘shall still, he says, rag 
for a cause of this finiteness, and ‘do 
finding an answer regret t sition. 
But let any one “attend td these: two 
difficulties, and say if fey are” 
magnitude. We reject one suppositio 
because it involves a contradiction, and 
we reject the other ‘because we’ cannot 
tell why it should be trues) °°"? 
5,.—This clause respects the power of 
the eternal Being, and’ the conclusion 
come to eur must necessarily be 
omnipotent, and this omipotence is de- 
fined to be “ a superiority to erty 
thing else.’ I would go further, an 
say that what we mean by this term” is 
completely embodied in the triumphant 
exclamation of Coleridge, and ‘implies 
not only a superiority to every thing 
besides, but an actual possession of all 
the power which exists, and all the 
power which we may imagine can ever 
exist. It is the Inquirer, and not Col- 
ridge, that sets limits to omnipotence, 
for the Omnipotent may possess @ 
superiority to every thing else, without 
possessing that power to which “he is 
superior, and that in this case we may 
suppose the power of one increased ‘by 
the accession of the other to it. “A 
man is superior to a dog in his power 
to move any body; yet their united 
efforts will accomplish the task much 
more easily than if exerted sepa- 
rately. ' Tait,» 
This definition by Coleridge, that the 
Omnipotent “ has all the power that is— 
he cannot have the power that is not,” 
certainly does not dimit omnipotence, 
while it maintains that he has all the 
power that is. Indestructibility is 
clearly one of the essential attributes:of 
a self-existent being, and, consequently; 
no power of destroying it can ever exist; 
and if the power can never by possibilic 
ty exist, it is not absurd to say that an 
omnipotent being does not possess such 
power, because the supposition of such 
leads us to a contradiction. And if we 
attend to the radical idéa conveyed ‘by 
the word, we shall’be corivinced of the 
truth of the assumption TET tery 
_—all-powerful—that is, capable\of doing 
every thing, without exception ‘er °ré- 
striction; but what does not exist} and 
what by the supposition ean never exist, 
cannot be a thing or object*either for 
a 
reflection on, or anticipation of? © 1° 
If it can bé* demonstrated’ that any 
being ‘is omnipotent, théndt imistfollow 
that he miist be omniprestilOr eri 
every Wliere; in order teaeH everywhere, 
which oimnipoteitee mist Ve Cipable wt 
TARE Ze 
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