Colonel Kennepy on the Védinta System. 421 
have not been able to find in them a single Stiéra which, in my opinion, 
would bear such a meaning. In fact, the Sanscrit language does not con- 
tain any term equivalent to the word matter ; and even the four principal 
schools of Hindi philosophy concur in rejecting the notion of matter which 
has invariably prevailed in Europe. For the Véddnlicas declare, that what 
appears to be:such is a mere illusion; the Sanc’hyas consider the universe to 
be the development of a plastic nature, in the same manner as the tree 
is developed from the seed, to which they also ascribe the power of again 
withdrawing such development into itself, in the way that a tortoise 
puts forth and retracts its members; and the followers of Gérama and 
Cay’Ave hold that substance is an aggregation of atoms, which are con- 
stantly liable to separation, and even to returning to their original unagere- 
gated and imperceptible state. But it will be evident, that none of these 
definitions apply to the different opinions which have been entertained 
respecting matter, by the philosophers of Europe, and consequently this term 
ought to be carefully avoided, whenever it is wished to convey a correct 
description of Hindi philosophy. 
No doubt, however, but that the illustrations and examples adduced in 
explanation of the Véddnta, might seem to warrant the conclusion that it is 
a mere system of materialism, for never were more inapplicable examples 
adduced to illustrate any subject; as for instance, the favourite one, in 
describing the repeated destruction and reproduction of the universe, of the 
spider spinning its web from its own substance and then retracting it : since, 
were this example to be understood literally, it would follow, contrary to 
the texts of the Védas above quoted, that it was matter and not spirit which 
had eternally existed. The other comparisons, also, which are generally 
employed—the rays from the sun, the sparks from fire, the stream from its 
source, air confined within a closed vessel, are all equally incompatible with 
the real doctrine of the Véddnta. But this figurative language never for a 
moment misleads, even the least informed follower of this school, for 
after making use of such illustrations, which so clearly admit the existence 
of duality, he will immediately maintain that what appears to be matter is 
mere illusion, and that nothing really exists except spirit. The Védinta 
writers, at the same time, in general qualify such arguments as imply an 
admission that matter is a reality, by employing such terms as, “to speak 
popularly, or according to common use,” or some such like expression. In 
reading Véddnta works, therefore, the utmost attention should be paid to 
812 
