422 Colonel Krewnepy on the Védanta System. 
this circumstance ; since, were it not adverted to, the greatest part of San- 
cara’s commentary on the S%ras of VyAsa would be self-contradictory, as, 
in refuting the opinions of opposite sects, he of course makes use of words 
according to their usual acceptation. Nor, in attempting to explain the 
ideal system which the Védanticas profess, would it be possible to avoid all 
expressions and illustrations of a material nature ; for they do not deny that, 
to all intents and purposes, man, while the soul is imprisoned in the body, 
unless he becomes enlightened by divine knowledge, is impressed with the 
firm belief that matter really exists, and that he must, in consequence, act 
according to this belief. 
It is this marked difference between its practical and speculative tenets, 
that so remarkably distinguishes the Védanta from all other systems of 
philosophy. But this distinction rests solely and entirely on the doctrine 
of Mdyd—on the belief that the human soul, though the same originally as 
the Supreme Soul, is by some mysterious means excluded from participa- 
tion in the divine nature, and exposed to many illusive appearances and 
sensations which are productive of joy and sorrow, pleasure and pain, 
both in this and in a future life. It is at the same time maintained, as it 
appears from the four great sentences above quoted, that this exclusion does 
not actually exist, and that such a supposition is a mere illusive conception 
proceeding from ignorance, the erroneousness of which is immediately per- 
ceived if the human mind becomes enlightened by divine knowledge. 
Until then, however, man must act precisely in the same manner as if all 
the illusive appearances with which he was surrounded had a real exis- 
tence ; and it is even considered deserving of blame if an individual adopts 
a contemplative life, before he has for a considerable time performed all the 
duties incidental to his station in society. But the apparent man is, in 
reality, an undivided part of the Supreme Soul itself, and it is mental dark- 
ness alone which conceals this truth from him, and leads him to suppose that 
he, and other similar appearances, possess material forms, and that this uni- 
verse not only actually exists, but that it is composed of material substances. 
It will be hence evident, that the Véddnta does not in any respect cor- 
respond with any system of European philosophy, for it neither derives 
substances, admitted to be material, from the divine nature of the Supreme 
Being, nor does it identify him with the universe, and it equally rejects an 
eternal matter co-existent with him, and a matter created ex nihilo. In it, 
also, the denegation of the real existence of sensible objects is simple and 
