250 Notes to Mi\ B. H. Hodgson's Sketch of Buddhism. 



ofpravritti, Buddha, the type of active power, first proceeds from it and then associates 

 with it, and from that association results the actual visible world. The principle is 

 feigned to be a female, first the mother, and then the wife, of the male Buddha. (For a 

 glimpse at the esoteric sense of these tenigmas, see note 29.) 



(13) The work cited is of secondary authority ; but the mode of reasoning exhibited 

 in the text is to be found in all Batuld/ia works which treat of the Sicabht'ivika doctrine. 



(14) This is the name of the Theistic school of the Buuddha philosophers. The 

 Sambhu Puruna and Guna Knranda VyvJia contain the least obscure enunciation of 

 Theism — and these books belong to Nipal. Other Bmiddha scriptures, however, which 

 are not local, contain abundant expressions capable of a Theistic interpretation. Even 

 those Bauddha philosophers who have insisted that matter is the sole entity, have ever 

 magnified the wisdom and power of nature: and doing so, they have reduced the 

 difference of theism and atheism almost to a nominal one: so, at least, they frequently 

 affirm. 



The "reat defect of all the schools is the want of Providence and of dominion in their 

 cama causarum, though the comparatively recent Karmikas and Yulnikas appear to 

 have attempted to remedy this defect. (See the following note.) 



(15) Of two of the four schools oi Baxtddlia philosophy, namely, the Swabhi'iviha and 

 Aishivariha, I have already said a few words : the two remaining schools are deno- 

 minated the Kimnika and Ytitnilui — from the words Karma, meaning moral action ; 

 and Yalna, signifying intellectual force, skilful effort. The proper topics of these two 

 schools seem to me to be confined to the phenomena of fiumati nature — its free-will, its 

 sense of right and wrong, and its mental power. To the wisdom of Swabhava, or 

 Prajna', or A'di-Buddha, the Bauddlws, botli Swablumkas and Aishivarikas, had assigned 

 that eternal necessary connexion of virtue and felicity in which they alike believed. 

 It remained for the Karmihas and Yutnikas to discuss how each individual free-willed 

 man might most surely hope to realize that connexion in regard to himself; whether 

 by tlie just conduct of his understanding, or by the proper cultivation of his moral 

 sense? And the Ytitnikas seem to have decided in favour of the former mode; the 

 Karmikas, in favour of the latter. Having settled these points, it was easy for the 

 Ydtnllias and Karmikas to exalt their systems by linking them to the tlirone of the 

 causa causarum — to which they would be the more leadily impelled, in order to remove 

 from their faith the obloquy so justly attaching to the ancient Pr/ijnika, and even to 

 the Aishicarika school, because of the want of Providence and of Dominion in their 

 first cause. That the Kurmikas and Yutnikas originally limited themselves to the 

 phenomena of human nature, I think probable, from the circumstances that, out of 

 some forty slocas which I have had collected to illustrate the doctrines of these schools, 

 scarcely one goes beyond the point of whether man's felicity is secured by virtue or by 

 intellect .'' And that, when these schools go further (as I have the evidence of two 

 quotations from their books that they sometimes do), the trespassing on ground foreign 

 to their systems seems obvious ; thus in the Divya Avadim, Sa'kya says, " from the 

 union of Upa'ya and Puajna' arose man — the lord of the senses; and from man 



