1825.] 
canvassed pretty closely; when two of 
the company, taking peculiar interest in 
the subject, grew so warm in its discus- 
sion, and made so many just and strik- 
ing observations i in support of their op- 
posite opinions, that they were suffered 
gradually to engross the conversation. 
As nearly as I can recollect, the fol- 
lowing dialogue constituted the sub- 
stance of their dispute ; which, appear- 
ing to me not unworthy of being pre- 
served, I afterwards committed to paper, 
as correctly as my memory would per- 
mit. It is now, Sir, submitted to your 
judgment, by yours, &c. 
Dec. 13, 1824. Puiro-Virtus. 
Junius.—Your remarks, Lucius, would 
insinuate that I know not what virtue really 
is. ; 
Lucius.—By no means. Knowing that 
all actions are virtuous which are calculated 
to benefit mankind, and improve their pub- 
lic and private condition, you know what 
virtue is. 
Jun.—Then I know that no man is more 
virtuous than Justus. His conduct, uni- 
formly upright and beneficient, declares 
the purity. of his principles. Where is 
there a firmer friend of moral truth and 
rational freedom,—where a more zealous 
patron of virtue and genius ? 
Luc.—I know Justus, and esteem him. 
He is all you pronounce him to be: but 
still he is not a man of virtue. 
Jun.—Not a man of virtue? -Are not 
many the happier for his existence? Does 
not his amenity conciliate every one? Do 
not his sense and knowledge administer to 
the gratification of the enlightened? Is 
not his purse ever open to the unfortunate ? 
And shall we not: judge of the tree by its 
fruits 2 
Inuc.—Yes; of its qualities as a fruit- 
bearer: but the excellence of the fruit is 
no demonstration of the merit of the tree. 
Shew me the tree throwing forth its fruit 
by its own choice, and I will admit that 
the tree is meritorious. 
Jun.—lI perceive your meaning. Justus 
is not entitled to the praise of goodness, be- 
cause he is good by a kind of innate neces- 
sity.’ Perhaps, as being’ good from no 
other cause, you would even resolve him 
into a bad man. 
Lac.—By an equal necessity of an oppo- 
site description, he would, undoubtedly, 
have been a bad man—an injurious man. 
As it is, he constitutes a valuable. but not 
a virtuous man. 
Jun.—You are pleased to be paradoxical. 
Ine.—No; Justus is virtuous on the 
same principle that another man is vicious. 
Morality is his gratification. He practices 
temperance, because to a man of his mo- 
derate passions, temperance is natural—is 
an -enjoyment. Endowed with suscepti. 
Monrury Maa, No. 407. 
The true Principles of Virtue ; a Dialogue. 
113 
bilities that expose him to pain, when ap- 
prized of the afflictions of others; and 
averse to pain, according to the universal 
law of human nature, he does but obey that 
law, does but fly from pain, when he takes 
the only measure that can relieve his own 
uneasiness. 
Jun.—If this be true, to constitute a 
virtuous man, it is sufficient that he be 
involuntarily good. His concern for the 
sufferings of his fellow-creatures must 
spring from his tenderness for himself. 
Luc.—Not necessarily so, It may re- 
sult from his judgment; from his mind’s 
conviction, that the benefit he bestows is 
due to the merit of the individual he re- 
lieves. When the exercise of his benevo- 
lence is the operation of his reason: then 
is he a virtuous man. 
Jun.—This is complimenting the head 
at the expense of the heart,—making vir- 
tue independent of the finer passions of 
our nature; is dignifying the coldness of 
rational calculation with the honours due, 
alone, to that noble effervescence which 
inflames, aggrandizes and melts all the ten- 
der, the great, and the truly ardent of soul. 
The source of virtue, which you singly 
admit, would—pardon, Lucius, the im- 
pression you yourself have made—almost 
persuade me that, secretly, you disbelieve. 
in the existence of any human virtue what- 
ever. Do-you really think that any such 
quality rules the conduct of mankind? 
Luc.—I have explained that I do. 
Jun.—And do you admit the existence 
of vice ? 
Luc.—The absence of the virtue, I have 
admitted, is nearly related to vice. It is 
negative viciousness ; but it is viciousness. 
It is the link between absolute virtue and 
positive vice ; but partakes infinitely more 
of the latter than of the former. 
Jun.—Does the conduct of Justus con- 
cord more with your idea of vice, or with 
your notion of virtue ? 
Luc.-—Not at all with my conception of 
virtue, because it is prompted by his con- 
stitution, not by his reflection and judg- 
ment. 
Jun.—Is his conduct at all conformable 
with your idea of vice? 
Luc.—Certainly not. 
Jun.-—Since then vice and virtue are 
opposites, Justus is a virtuous man. 
Luc. — What I have admitted only 
. amounts to the acknowledgment, that his 
actions are good. 
Jun.—It is amply sufficient, in my opi- 
nion, for a man’s conduct to be good, to 
entitle him to the reputation of a virtuous 
man. The minute scrutiny, into which the 
principle on which you would decide upon 
the real merit of beneficial actions would 
carry us, is, at best, but a trivial and pro- 
fitless refinement. Referring to your own 
allusion of the tree and its fruit, the fruit 
is the surest proof of the quality of the 
tree, and the metaphor is, as truly as beau- 
Q tfully, 
