114 
tifully, figurative of human virtue, and the 
meritorious deeds of which it is the source. 
What think you of the precept which en- 
joins our doing to others as we would have 
others do unto us ? 
Luc.—No body admires more than I do 
the wisdom which reduced the whole duty 
of man to man, to one noble comprehen- 
sive aphorism. 
Jun.—Yet are you not convinced of the 
virtue of Justus, whose life has evidently 
been so much regulated by that divine rule 
of conduct. 
Luc.—Were I, Junius, as convinced as 
yourself, that Justus has been actuated by 
the principle couched in this doctrine, I 
should revere~him no less than you do: 
but candour compels me to confess, that I 
attribute all the actions, by which his life 
has been distinguished from the career of 
less honourable and less charitable men, 
purely to that debility of nerve, that invo- 
luntary sensibility, that weak hen-hearted- 
ness, which seeks its own ease ‘or gratifi- 
cation in the acts which that very weakness 
dictates. 
Jun.—This art of confounding virtue 
with weakness is more ingenious than sa- 
tisfactory. If actions, however service- 
able to the world, and men, however soli- 
citous to promote the happiness of society, 
are to be little esteemed, because we can- 
not know the secret springs of the first, 
‘ nor the hidden motives of the second, no 
value can be attached to any actions or any 
men whatever. Then, indeed, there is no 
virtue in the world. To say nothing of 
the right, which all men may claim, to have 
their conduct received as the true key to 
their motives (where the contrary does not 
evidently appear), what better guide can 
we obtain to the views and purposes of 
men than are presented to us by their daily 
deeds? What more uncharitable, what 
more unequitable, than; while we see so- 
ciety and ourselves indebted to their vir- 
tuous course of life, to impute their bene- 
ficial demeanour to unworthy motives? 
You admire the precept which teaches us 
to do as we would be done by: is it doing 
as we would be done by, to attribute good 
actions to bad motives? Your own actions 
are good,—are your motives, by conse- 
quence, bad? Would you be pleased at 
having them supposed to be bad ? 
_ Lue.—You are now making the dispute 
personal. 
._Jun.—As not. being to the disadvantage 
of your moral and intellectual character, it 
is admissible; as rendermg my argument 
more cogent and convincing, it is eligible. 
No one is more prompt than yourself to 
succour helpless misery, no one more 
ready to wipe away the tear from weeping 
innocence—say if it be not true. 
Luc.—I will not disown the pleasnre 
afforded me by the view of wretchedness 
relieved, and innocence protected. 
Jun.—By your own hand ? 
‘Madame Belloc’s Defence of Lord Byron. 
(Mar. I, 
Luc.—By any hand. 
Jun.—Aye—even by your own. Go, 
thou man of debilitated nerves, of involun- 
tary sensibility, of weakness, of hen-heart- 
edness !—go, and seek better actions than 
we daily see you yourself performing, if 
better you can find; produce me, if you 
are able, purer motives than those by which 
the general course of your own conduct is 
dictated. Do this, and I will admit that 
you, Lucius, are not the honourable, li- 
beral, kind-hearted man I have hitherto 
supposed you; and will join in the cool 
and discouraging opinion you entertain of 
Justus. 
[We have given insertion, for the sake of 
a rare variety, to this specimen of subtile 
argumentation — principally because we 
think this colloquially-dramatie form of dis- 
quisition, once too much in use, las now 
become too generally discarded. - But it is 
not our intention to make it a precedent, 
for turning out of our track of practical 
utilities, for fine-spun speculations and 
metaphysical distinctions about the nature 
of human motives, and the occult causes 
of human action. The essential object of 
all reasonable desire, is the welfare (that is 
to say, the happiness) of mankind; and the 
wisdom of benevolence is, to encourage the 
acts that tend to this, rather than scrutinize 
the principles upon which they are per- 
formed. The greatest good to the greatest 
number, is the virtue of an Utilitarian: and 
to this it is our desire that our pages should 
minister.—EDIr. ] 
——— 
For the Monthly Magazine. — 
Lorp Byron. By Manams Louise 
Sw. Bettoc. . 
[From the Revue Encyclopédique.] 
GENEROUS disposition, en- 
lightened mind, and noble inde- 
pendence of character, can alone have 
induced a woman, full of the reserve 
and modesty of her sex, to undertake 
the difficult task of avenging, criticising 
and bringing into notice the great poet 
whom England has just lost; the noble 
champion whose premature death all 
Greece bewails. What difficulties has 
Madame Belloc imposed upon herself ! 
Let us point them out by some reflec- 
tions drawn from the subject. During 
his life, Lord Byron was almost banished 
the society of English ladies; injured 
and disowned, in the person of their 
countrywoman, they vowed inveterate 
hate, and vindicated their fierce resent- 
ment with the interests of their sex, 
insulted in a young and handsome wife. 
England could not pardon the noblest 
of her children who had so debased her. 
This proud country drove him from her 
bosom, and he became a citizen of the 
world; but was unable to escape the 
reprobation 
