-XXVill Ai. W. A. Lewis on 
reason and C,’s reason * good,” he yet “ considers” another 
reason better, that D. in his turn declines to follow the con- 
clusion of B. and C. Where perception is the only guide and 
standard, A., B. and C. may fairly differ, considering that the 
subject-matter is so obscure as we have seen that it is. 
But it does not do to forget that we are concerned with not 
only the independent judgment but also with the preferences of 
individuals. ‘There is scope in nomenclature for the operation 
of a writer’s preferences ; and sometimes all do not agree on 
the value of this or that author. There are list-editors* so pos- 
sessed with the paramount importance of the Fabrician nomen- 
clature that they are committed to supporting the Fabrician 
names, recognizable or unrecognizable, under all circumstances. 
There is another author who (as we have seen) has placed on 
record his conviction that it is necessary to neglect altogether 
the great majority of the Fabrician names in the group which 
he specially affects, because they are unrecognizable or are 
found to be only synonyms for names given before. 
Now the reasons which have appeared ‘‘ good” to one writer 
and not good to another have brought about contradictory 
results, though each writer has pursued his investigations 
subject to the direction of the same principle and the area for 
difference is restricted to one solitary point. It is while 
“priority” pure and simple receives the unsparing adhesion of 
those who publish lists, that the reasons which each considers 
*‘oood” have landed us in confusion. But M. Candéze’s pro- 
posal is very remarkable. The fact that good reasons send 
him sometimes to the side of the reformers and sometimes to 
the other side is used as an argument for throwing off the 
single controlling enactment which does now supply the essen- 
tials for an agreement ; and this without putting anything in 
its place. Under this plan then the reasons which an author 
may consider “ good” will be reasons for following priority or 
ignoring it, for rejecting the first name (of which M. Candéze 
has given us an instance), or insisting on it, and we must now 
take it that this prominent entomologist has declared himself 
free from the rule of priority as it at present stands. M. Can- 
deze’s system seems to leave us without anchor, chart or 
compass. Heretofore divergences in judgment have been 
restricted to modus operandi. Henceforward, all is to be dis- 
cretionary. I dread to contemplate the condition at which, as 
it seems to me, our nomenclature will arrive in two years if 
such a principle receive acceptance. To institute a parallel 
which holds good in some respects,—it does happen that courts 
f * Amazing as this statement seems, it is unvarnished truth; see the 
preface to Gemminger and von Harold’s Munich Catalogue, pp. x., xi. 
(See also Discussion of Priority, pp. 40—45.) 
