292 Remarks on a Work entitled 
tasting, for these substances, though insipid to us, may be palat- 
able and relishing to insects. Few that have seen the penchant of 
certain insects for substances to us disgusting or insipid, and the 
avidity with which they devour them, can doubt this. Do we not 
say they have a “ taste” for such things, and by what other words 
can we express the idea? 
HEARING. 
Many have been the theories as to the seat of this sense in 
insects, and it is a matter not yet satisfactorily determined ; never- 
theless there are so many facts in insect economy that imply the 
possession of it, that it has not hitherto been possible to deny its 
existence in some insects at any rate. Why have they the power 
of making a noise if not to be heard by others of their species ? 
And that such is the case is proved by the answers returned to 
them. Yet this sense, like the others, our author denies they 
possess, and curiously recites the following in corroboration. 
* The melancholy click of the death-watch (Anobium) loses all 
its terrors when it is found that the ominous sound is not a voice, 
but the result of mechanical friction. You have only to send 
him a counter-scratch from your side of the wainscot, when, mis- 
taking you for a brother Anobium, he returns the signal.” Why, 
is not this admitting that he heard the noise ? 
Under this head (though I do not see any connexion therewith) 
follows a number of instances of the wonderful proceedings of 
insects, ‘* none of which,” says Dr. Badhain, “ can proceed from 
sensuous impressions, if what has now been written against the 
probability of insects possessing the senses be correct.” It is 
added, “ from the above examples, which it would be foreign to 
my purpose and useless to multiply, it appears that the intelligence 
which prompts the actions of the dog, or of the higher animals 
generally, has no share in bringing about any of those of which 
insects are the agents. First, because, as we have seen, anterior 
to all experience or apprenticeship, they execute faultlessly what- 
ever they have to do. Secondly, because on the supposition of 
the conduct of an insect proceeding from intelligence at all, we 
should be obliged to admit that he shows in one part of his conduct 
a greater and in another a less amount of it than could possibly 
proceed from one and the same individual; and lastly, because 
many of the daily actions of insects cannot ve explained by re- 
ferring them merely to intelligence, but suppose prescience as well, 
which, as it is not an attribute of brutes, can much less be sup- 
posed to belong to creatures so vastly below them as insects.”’ 
