1826.] Chancery. 29 



neither by the common law nor by statute, — wliy, in the name of 

 common sense, should not some steps be taken to make a law, and 

 peremptorily settle the question ? Then it would no longer be a sub- 

 ject for wearisome discussion in courts of equity, and courts of law 

 would know what to do with it. Every man, as he ought, might then 

 be his own lawyer. 



But there has yet been no opportunity^ Does any one believe an 

 opportunity will ever be seized, or willingly made ? When was a decree 

 of equity converted into statute law ? There is no want of charity 

 here ; the noble individual who presides has, at least, never shewn a 

 disposition to reduce the business of his court. 



2. A case (the names of the parties have escaped us), where an 

 appeal is carried from the rolls to the vice-chancellor, and by him re- 

 scinded ; the rescindment is taken to the chancellor, who expresses 

 amazement at the interference of his vice, who, he declares, has no 

 authority but what emanates from him. Now, here is pretty confusion ! 

 Lawyers complain they often know not what court to apply to^ — and 

 well they may, when even the judges themselves seem ignorant of the 

 objects and limits of their jurisdiction. No house of business could 

 get on for a month, where the managers did not keep to their several 

 departments ; or an office make any despatch, where the clerks did not 

 distinctly understand their respective duties. But, in the complica- 

 tions of the cliancery, all seems left to chance. If new arrangements 

 are sometimes ordered, of late years, by a singular, but permanent 

 fatality, they invariably prove productive of fresh confusion. It is high 

 time the authorities of each court be defined by law. A division of the 

 labour of these courts has long been demanded, and the very variety 

 of business brought before them facilitiites division. Wards, bank- 

 rupts, lunatics — let these be appropriated to separate courts, each inde- 

 pendent of the yther, with one common appeal to the Lords. But 

 this will lessen the dignity of the chancellor — Not an atom, essen- 

 tially. He is oppressed with business — a state scarcely compatible with 

 dignity. He will still be the highest law officer of the country — speaker 

 of the upper house — member of the cabinet — diapenser of boundless 

 patronage — entitled to precedence, &c. &c. But such division will 

 prejudice the interests of counsel — Let them confine their labours to 

 particular courts, and be content — is the interest of a profession to be 

 put in competition with that of a community ? 



3. A case of habeas occupies the court three days, necdum friiia. 

 A very simple case — a woman committed by a commission of bank- 

 ruptcy for refusing to answer interrogatories, applies for her habeas, 

 and applies to the chancer3\ What does the chancellor? Begins to 

 hear, as might be expected — entertains the application — all other 

 business, pressing though it be, is suspended — business, observe, which, 

 as affairs are constituted, can be considered no where else. Three 

 days are occupied, and at the breaking-up of the court, the judge 

 impotently complains of the case being brought before him, when every 

 one of the twelve judges were authorized to hear similar applications, and 

 were so authorized, he says, expressly to relieve himself. Then, why 

 was the case for a moment entertained? W^as not the fact as well 

 known on the first day as the third? Truly, it is all the very fondness 

 of dotage. 



The court is a scene of confusion daily ; suitors present themselves 



