1826.] Revolution al Palermo, in the Year 1820. 119 



rising, unless they abandoned their respective posts, and retired upon 

 their regiments in the general order of battle. Neglect (which miglit 

 be almost termed systematic) of all precautionary measures, had pre- 

 vailed throughout tlie kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and more particu- 

 larly in Palermo. The fort of Castel a Mare, the only shelter provided 

 for its garrison, was in a dilapidated state, and without an ounce of 

 provisions ; and was thus rendered rather a trap to ensure, than a retreat 

 to prevent its capture. Moreover, the troops had to guard 3,000 galley 

 slaves, whose principal prison was in the Cassero, the great street of 

 Palermo. 



The arsenal was also in the centre of the town, and only defended 

 by a slight pallisade, such as would be thrown round a field-park of 

 artillery in a campaign. 



It was difficult, with a small garrison of 2,000 men, for the most part 

 disaffected, and with many such obstacles as the above, to fix upon an 

 advantageous order of battle, in the event of a revolt. Nor did the pro- 

 tection of the viceroy seem to me unimportant, as I had good reason 

 to imagine that his excellency would probably not consent to abandon 

 the town until that measure had become impracticable; yet, in the event 

 of a crisis, nothing but his departure could have saved the troops, sup- 

 posing them all steady to their colours, and that theii- colours had not 

 been changed. 



Three principal objects occupied my attention ; and in my order of 

 " ralliement" for the troops I kept them all in view, namely: — 1st, a 

 position from whence I could overawe the town, and not be subject to 

 an attack from the inhabitants in a bad position, or to be fired upon 

 from the houses, except at a considerable distance, which was well 

 flanked, and in which I could make use of musquetry, artillery and 

 cavalry : — 2d, a position open to the country for retreat, if necessary ; 

 and capable of some defence against the country, in the event of the 

 peasantry attacking the rear of the troops : — 3d, a position preserving 

 my communication with the sea, and holding three gates of the town. 



Any one acquainted with the topography of Palermo, will imme- 

 diately recognize this position of my order of battle, communicated to 

 the generals and commanding officers of regiments by the following 

 outline : — The right of the infantry was at the King's palace ; and in the 

 square which it protects behind the palace, in the open space towards the 

 country, was formed the cavalry, in column of half squadrons ; the centre 

 outside the town, formed of the infantry, was to occupy the line (with 

 small intervals) between the palace and the fort of Castel ii Mare, 

 which formed the left of the position. In this manner the troops would 

 have been masters of the principal streets of Palermo without being 

 obliged to enter them ; of three of the gates of the town ; and of the 

 forts, with their communications open with the sea and the country, 

 with other advantages of importance in such a critical state. 



Thus I had, as far as lay in my power, made preparations for defence, 

 in the case of a revolt at Palermo, before the intelligence arrived of the 

 overthrow of the King's government at Naples. But in the bloody and 

 frightful scenes by which most popular tumults are marked, all mutual 

 dependence is in a moment lost, when once the numerical strength of 

 the populace is unchained ; the friends of the morning become the mortal 

 enemies of the afternoon ; revenge, rapine and riot alone command; and 

 every dark passion is exasperated to madness ; while the sacred names 



