1826.] Leaves torn out of a Common-place Book. 14§ 



than those which are entertained, with respect to Russia, both in Eng- 

 land and in France. Such a gigantic, but unwieldy power, may be 

 most formidable when attacked, but if she is not supported by readier 

 resources than her own, can hardly be dangerous in aggressive and 

 distant warfare. Even her late defensive and offensive operations 

 (though these, owing to concurrent circumstances, were such as to 

 a superficial observer might give an extravagant notion of her power) 

 will lower such an opinion, if it be dispassionately considered ; for, ob- 

 serve, what an accumulation of circumstances was in favour of Russia, 

 and yet how little she profited by them, while, as yet, fortified only by 

 her own resources. A cabinet war had, by the rashness of Buonaparte, 

 been converted into a national one. The whole population of a martial 

 and united people had been provoked, and the invaders, composed of 

 various nations, and consequently distrustful of one another, possessed 

 only the ground which they occupied. In this position, under that 

 infatuation which prevents men from looking dangers in the face, which 

 are too obvious and too terrible to be closely considered, these invaders 

 suffered the Russians to amuse them with the prospect of peace, till 

 the nets were closed about them, and the hunters were already in their 

 front, flanks, and rear. Under such desperate circumstances, aggravated 

 by the horrors of a climate new to them, but to which their enemies 

 were accustomed to contend, the French commenced their retreat and 

 fled ; " bootless home and weather-beaten back," yet, flying as they did, 

 without order, weapons, or provisions, what military advantages were 

 achieved over them ? The Russians, though in their own country, and with 

 their own Cossacks to purvey for them in following their enemies, 

 suffered yet more severely than their enemies themselves ; when, in the 

 latter part of their march, two good squadrons of dragoons, supported 

 by a brigade of infantry, might, as it is confessed, have trampled them 

 into dust. It is true that the Russians, when strengthened by the de- 

 fection of those who had made a main-part of the French armies — when 

 supplied by a foreign commissariat, and supported by foreign money and 

 supplies — hunted home, and brought to bay, the enemy which had 

 bearded him in his den ; but it is not the question — what may be done 

 by brave, active, and intelligent semi-barbarians, when set in motion, 

 and assisted by civilized nations ? — the question is, what an]empire com- 

 posed of such materials can do by its own unassisted efforts ? This ex- 

 periment has been tried. 



" Potuit qua; plurima virtus, 

 Esse,fuit: Toto certatum at corpore regni." 



Among the striking circumstances attending the return of the French 

 armies, whether moral, military, or political, a fact seems to deserve 

 notice, which has not been commented on by those who have inves- 

 tigated and detailed all the other and minutest occurrences of this 

 memorable f%ht. Wliat I mean is the confirmation of the opinion of 

 Machiavel, of the general inutility of 



• Fortified Places. — Buonaparte took, as is well known, the precaution of 

 garrisoning those which lay on his line of march, and which promised 

 either to assure his conquests or his retreat. The result is well known 

 These can hardly be said to have arrested the advance of his pursuers. 

 Tlie places were observed or besieged by an inferior description of 

 force ; while the chosen troops of the coalesced nations followed up the 



