1826.] L 363 ] 



LECTURE ON VERBICIDE — BY A MAN ' OF THE LAW. 



Young Gentlemen: — Verbicide, from verbum a word, and coed* 

 I kill — the kilting of a word, anglice, panning — is of three kinds : to wit, 

 1. justifiable; 2. excusable; and 3. felonious, or wilful and malicious. 

 Justifiable verbicide, as the definition would appear to imply, is without 

 blame, and, of course, without guilt :* excusable verbicide is not alto- 

 gether free from guilt ; and felonious, or wilful and malicious verbicide, 

 is of a nature so entirely without justification or excuse, that, compared 

 with it, all other sins against language, are looked upon as trivial. 



Like homicide, a well understood offence, I hope, with all who now 

 hear me, verbicide is justifiable, when it occurs under authority of law: 

 excusable, when it occurs in the lawful pursuit of a lawful occupation, 

 either per infortuniam, i. e. by misadventure, or se dcfendendo, that is, 

 in the lawful exercise of the right of self-defence, or self-preservation : 

 but felonious, whenever it is neither justifiable nor excusable ; or, in 

 other words, whenever it is wilful and malicious hy interpretation of 

 law.f 



Felonious verbicide is of two kinds. It is either a killing of our own 

 word (fclodese?), or the killing of another's word, which is again 

 divided into verb-slaughter and murder ; properly, murther, from the 

 Saxon word mnrth, death. 



The law, which we all know to be the perfection of reason, declares 

 that every sort of deliberate verbicide or punning, perpetrated or com- 

 mitted, not by authority of law, nor by permission of law, is a mali- 

 cious punning ; deliberation itself being evidence of a bad or mischievous 

 temper, although it may be attended with every symptom of good fel- 

 lowship and good humour (as in the case of a preconcerted toss-up for 

 love — vide note f ). 



Malice may be either express or implied : express, where one with a 

 deliberate design, which design is to be inferred or implied, from parti- 

 cular circumstances, doth commit a pun ; implied, when, without any 

 such deliberation, it is inferred from other particular circumstances. To 

 make this beautiful distinction yet more clear to those who may not be 

 altogether acquainted with our legal metaphysics, I will add, that malice 

 may be either express or implied by law ; express, where it cannot be 

 implied — and implied, where it cannot be express ; implied, where it 

 may be inferred by law from a particular class of circumstances — and 

 express, where it may be inferred by law, from another particular class 

 of circumstances. 



There may be a punning, which is neither justifiable, nor excusable, 

 nor yet malicious, in the eye of the law, though done without necessity, 

 not in self-defence, but under great provocation, with a feeling of hatred 

 or revenge — as where a pun is perpetrated, on the spot, after some 

 outrage offered to the party punning, mediately or immediately, and per- 



* Vide Blackstone, Hale, Foster, East, &c. &c. 



+ Malice may be implied, where it is not ; and where it is, it may be implied not to 

 be ! It may be implied from deliberation, which deliberation itself may be implied, 

 by law ; as where two Irishman, prize-fighters or sailors, meet, and knock each other's 

 heads about, for love. After a sudden provocation, if either die thereof, the law im- 

 plies not only malice, but express malice : it may therefore be implied, wiiere it is not. 

 And where it is, it may be implied not to be, as where an executioner declares a par-, 

 ficiilar spite or grudge toward one, whom he kills under authority of law. 



3 A •? 



