1826.] Chancery Report. 4-55 



on special grounds supported by affidavit. Final publication is, however, 

 at last accomplished ; and now the cause conies to be set down for 

 hearing. But even in this stage, the Commissioners discover the neces- 

 sity of" fixing limitations ; — without dwelling on particulars, it is sufficient 

 to mention their vigorous resolution of making the setting down peremp- 

 tory, in the very next term following the final publication. 



But setting down the cause, and actually hearing the cause, are quite 

 different things. Long lapses of time may intervene. Though the 

 cause be ready to be heard, the court may not be ready to hear. Actual 

 hearing, it is plain, must depend upon the business before the court, and 

 that is always greatly in arrear. Besides, many preliminaries are 

 perhaps yet to be settled ; appeals from masters and inferior judges of 

 the court, on matters of reference in all the previous stages of the cause; 

 and silk-gowns, bending under the burden of distended bags, must 

 exhaust their briefs before your unprivileged counsel can gain the 

 opportunity of even mentioning your cause. But still the cause, when it 

 is once set down to be heard, will take its course, and be heard in its 

 turn ; there is no irregularity or interruption allowed. Oh, we mistake 

 the matter greatly. The court is perpetually interrupted. There is a 

 multiplicity of business, which, come when it will, breaks in upon the 

 regular routine of causes — bankruptcies, lunacies, injunctions, wardships. 

 These are of constant recurrence ; and no man can be sure, though his 

 cause be at the head of the paper this morning, that some pressing and 

 irresistible subject will not be introduced, by some imperious or persuasive 

 counsel, and put him off indefinitely, days, weeks, months. Think of 

 Howard and Gibbs' bankruptcy — think again of Sir Gregory Page 

 Turner's and Lord Portsmouth's lunacies. All regular business sus- 

 pended whilst these were before the court. Think, again, upon the 

 sudden and imperative calls upon the Chancellor's time — fits of the gout, 

 too — how often he is obliged to break in upon counsel in the middle of a 

 speech, to attend the Cabinet, or the House of Lords, or the Recorder's 

 Report, or finally, to make room for the cloth to be laid. But even these 

 are not the only possible interruptions to the progress of your hearing. 

 Wlien the court opens, and nothing appears to arrest the Chancellor's 

 attention, and you are called upon to proceed — lo, your solicitor, oi the 

 defendant's, is not to be found, or one of the counsel is in another court ; 

 or, if he be at hand, his brief may not have been delivered in time, or at 

 all. What is the consequence? You are actually driven down to the 

 bottom of the list ; and, Sisyphus-like, must work your weary way up 

 again, perhaps only to experience the same fate, and be rolled down 

 again. — The wonder is, a cause ever gets heard at all ; and with the 

 present practice of the court, we may well conceive such an increase and 

 press of imperative business — such a flow and augmentation of occasional 

 matter, demanding immediate attention — such neglects on the part of 

 counsel and solicitors — such consuming procrastinations, that all chance 

 of getting a hearing, or eluding the gripe of the court, seems hopeless. 

 Li despair, you withdraw, or abandon, or accommodate as you can, and 

 thus at last dispose of the relics of contested property without its final 

 assistance. 



But, as causes sometimes are heard to an end, we will suppose the cause 

 to be heard and adjudged. Remains any thing still to be done ? Yes ; to 

 take down the minutes and draw up the decree. Decree ? — why is not 

 that done already by the judge ? No ; he pronounces judgment, and 

 gives the reasons on which his judgment is founded at fullest, and verj' 



