1829.] 
be pronounced so and so, because it is cor- 
rect—and correct, because it is fashionable, 
or polite, or learned, or according to ana- 
logy and usage, or sanctioned by the stage ; 
or, again, such and such pronunciations are 
to be shunned, because they are too learned, 
or vulger, &c. The compiler has mani- 
festly taken great pains, and consulted care- 
fully and critically all the established— 
orthoepists we find they are called—and we 
-haye no doubt is as weil deserving of con- 
fidence—to all who place confidence in such 
things—as any of them—vwith these special 
advantages, that the book is a small one, 
embracing on/y, which is surely all that is 
demanded, the doubtful words, and that 
the price cannot be considerable. 
If we were to give our opinion on certain 
pronunciations here recommended, we might 
object—but then our objections are mere 
matter of taste, and depend more on habit 
than inquiry—to the substitution of e for i 
in ad’-mie-ra-bl, ep-e-cu-re’-an, be-tu’-men, 
&c.—to pre-zhum/’-tshu-us, rit/-tshu-al, sat’- 
tshu-rate, &c.—to ad/-ju-la-tur’-re, ed’-ju- 
kate—to in-nish’-al, luk’-shu-re, naw’-she- 
ate. Where has the writer heard of pad’- 
jun-tre? Is not padg’-en-tre nearer the 
mark? Is not o-rawn’-zher-e (orangery) a 
queer-looking word, and would it not be 
a queer-sounding one ? And is not spur’-it 
gueerer still? To pronounce this latter 
word, as if written spe-rit, is declared, as we 
suppose it is, vulgar—but is not spur-it, if 
possible, more so—and is not spir-it both 
more according to analogy, literality, and 
even fashion? But enough of this. 
Conversations on Intellectual Philosophy, 
2 vols. 12mo. ; 1829.—This is wholly Dr. 
Brown ; and as every thing must get into 
the crucible of “ Conversations,” we are 
heartily glad the very able framer of these 
has chosen to melt Aim down rather than 
Dugald Stewart—not so much because we 
think ill of Stewart, and well of Brown, as, 
because, though Brown be not, perhaps, 
essentially better, he is so circumstantially. 
In all respects his equal—save only in the 
very equivocal advantage of knowing other 
people’s opinions—in subtility of intellect 
and flexibility of power—in easy and efiec- 
tive discrimination—in brilliant and vivify- 
ing development he is immensely his supe- 
_ Itis more difficult, we take it, in this coun- 
try than in any part of the world when once 
a man is seated at the top of his profession, 
to dispossess him. It is the most prevail- 
ing conviction among us, shewn more by 
deeds, if possible, than by words, thet the man 
who has by any means attained a sort of supre- 
- macyin any department, can have noequal — 
no other person’s opinion in that line can be 
worth a rush; and hence it is, we see every 
body running after one doctor, one surgeon, 
< lawyer, one chemist, one astronomer, 
_ one mathematician, one artist, one sfales- 
man, even though they are scores of men of 
| M.M. New Sevies.—Vou.VIUL. No. 39. 
Domestic and Foreign. 
. 
313 
equal powers, and, in the case of professions, 
starving for want of employment—while the 
fashionable individual is overwhelmed, and 
compelled, be his honesty what it will, to 
sacrifice ihe interests of his employers to 
their caprices, and pocket the difference. 
But the worst effect of this foolish and 
baby-like confidence is, that if a man find 
reason for contending with the principles or 
practice of the favourite, and venture to give 
expression to his conviction, he raises a nest 
of hornets about his ears—the friends of the 
idol unite to repel the invader, and as it is 
much easier to revile than refute, no scruples 
are spared to depreciate him, not merely as 
a mistaken man, but as a mischievous per- 
son, as one actuated by jealousy, or prompted 
by a restless spirit of opposition, and al- 
together unworthy of attention. Mr. D. 
Stewart, the acknowledged head of his 
branch of study, had prosecuted his class of 
researches, in which others had taken great 
liberties, with so much retenue and respect 
for all existing institutions as to secure the 
suffrage of all, and more especially of those 
who knew nothing of the subject. Dr. 
Brown succeeded him in the philosophical 
chair, and from the first moment opposed. 
his views with little or no consideration for 
his awthority—scarcely indeed noticing him 
—and ventured upon novel statements and 
bold expressions, which threw certain good 
people into a frenzy of alarm. He was 
young, ardent, something of a poet, adven- 
turous, and with a little dash of the coxcomb 
in his composition; he manifestly took 
pains to make the differences of docirine as 
glaring as possible, and certainly made no 
attempt to conciliate. At the bottom we 
do not believe the differences are at all 
essential—but consist almost wholly in form 
and language. We like Brown—both in 
form and language—because his statements, 
generally, are at least as satisfactory, and 
have much less of pedantry and assumpiion 
about them. 
Dugald Stewart distinguishes a thought, 
from the act of thinking—memory, from 
the thing remembered—judgment, from the 
thing judged—consciousness and conscience, 
from the subject ofconsciousness, &c. Where 
is the harm of this? He called memory, 
judgment, conscience, &c., faculties ; butthen 
he did not suppose them a something dif- 
JSerent from the mind itself. They were 
not new, or separate entities—it was merely 
his mode of expressing the feeling and 
phenomena. They were not, even in his 
representation of them, parts of the mind ; 
or, if they were, they were only metaphori- 
cally so. Dy. Brown will have no faculties 
at all—he extinguishes them all—the thing 
remembered is the memory, and nothing 
else—nothing of it exists, but what is pre- 
sent—no storehouses—no receptacles. Still 
the memory is distinguishable, at least from 
consciousness, for instance-—and to mark this 
distinction in whatever it consists, was all 
that Stewart aimed at. These very distinc. 
258 
