1828.) Court of Chancery. 227 
interest of the lord. The result was, that if the owner of a rent charge 
issuing out of twenty acres of land, should release its payment out of one 
acre, whatever may have been his intention to the contrary, he thereby 
extinguished the whole ; and because the maxim to which feudal prin- 
ciples had at a remote period given birth still exists, the absurdity in 
question survives to the present hour. No wonder then that under a 
system of law thus constituted a necessity should exist for some judicial 
power in the state, which was capable of adaptation with greater flexi- 
bility, to a state of society to which the unbending rules of the common 
law prevented it from accommodating itself. Such a power has all along 
indeed, been occasionally exercised by the great assembly of the nation. 
But the judicial operations of Parliament are rather confined to making 
provision for particular cases than extended to the establishment of new 
and general heads or principles of law ; and the only operative standing 
power in the state adequate to the achievement of these purposes, may 
accordingly be considered as residing in the Court of Chancery. We 
will put an illustration of each of the functions we have described. A 
party is by fraudulent representations entrapped into incurring the legal 
obligation of a bond, or he executes it under mistaken impressions of his 
liabilities. The law nevertheless cannot choose but enforce the obligation 
against him. As Portia expounded the statutes of Venice, so would be 
the interpretation of the law in England— : 
« For the intent and purpose of the law 
Hath full relation to the penalty, 
Which here appeareth due upon the bond.” 
Confessing the instrument of obligation, a court of law would not allow 
the party to ground his defence upon the extrinsic circumstances in 
which it was given. Equity would, however, upon proof of these cir- 
cumstances, interfere to order its cancellation. Again a tenant for life of 
a family estate takes upon himself to cut down the ornamental trees 
which are scattered about the Park. If law give any remedy at all, it is 
only by way of forcing damages from the offender. But money, though 
it will do a great deal in this kingdom of mammon, will not reinstate 
trees that have been once felled. The remedy at law then may prove 
little better, than the shutting the stable door after the steed is stolen. 
Equity, however, interferes not with the tardy compensation for the 
mischief which alone the law can afford. It brings the remedy which 
experience had dictated to be the only efficient one ; and by its process 
of injunction prevents the mischief, as soon as it has received sufficient 
evidence of its meditated perpetration. The administration, however, of 
this species of redress constitutes only a part of the jurisdiction of equity. 
In our historical sketch of the court which we gave in a former number,* 
we have seen the mass and variety of other subjects which has been con- 
stantly bringing within its jurisdiction. This accumulation there, was 
the proof of the meagreness of the common law—nor could it be expected 
that as the offspring of increasing civilization and increasing wealth, they 
would find provision in a system, which had been moulded before the 
wants which had gave birth to them had existence. 
We are far, however, from conceding that the Court of Chancery 
(setting aside all consideration as to its external forms of procedure) is 
ee 
* Court of Chancery, No. 30. 
2G2 
