228 Court of Chancery. [Serr 
either sufficiently imbued with the remedial principle to counteract the 
contracted legislation of the common law ; or that it is altogether the 
appropriate tribunal for the purpose. With respect to the first, it must 
be remembered that although in the earlier periods of its history, the 
subjects and extent of its judicature were very much left to the individual 
who presided on its bench, it has in later times become moulded into a 
formal system. It proceeds on principles as clearly defined, as nicely 
circumscribed as those of the common law ; and, perhaps, the only dif- 
ference between the two, lies in the extent of their range. With some 
little allowance for ‘ friction, the latter is bound by the circumscribed 
knowledge of the age in which it was founded ; the expanse of the former 
is measured by a few more centuries growth of society. We are not 
about to quarrel with this certainty of system—we should be the last to 
trust legislation to the arbitrary caprice of a chancellor ; and, indeed, 
even if “ our fathers had not declared before us, we should have seen in 
our own time” abundant proof of the danger. When we behold a 
tribunal assuming the extraordinary jurisdiction of snatching children 
from the custody of their parent, because the pious horror felt by its 
judge of the Great Lady of Babylon had extended itself to a dread of all 
the naughty women of London—and when we mark the same tribunal, 
pausing in the exercise of its ordinary functions, to hold its preliminary 
censorship upon the press—we have enough to bid us to prefer the dis- 
pensation of justice under some such definite heads as Fraud, Accident, 
Mistake, Trust, Account, to its administration under the more captivating 
title of ‘ Moral Equity.’ It is obvious, however, that unless a specific 
grievance can be brought under some one of its general subjects of juris- 
diction, redress may be sought in vain within the walls of this court ;-and 
we affirm that grievances of this description are of frequent occurrence. 
It is true that the doctrine is often bandied about that where no remedy 
can be obtained at law, relief is, ex necessitate, afforded in equity. This 
will be found correct, however, in those cases alone in which the subject 
matter can be brought within a recognized head of jurisdiction. When 
pressed to interfere in matter without this limit, judges have again and 
again refused relief, because they could be furnished with neither general 
principle or express precedent for their warrant. A former Marquis of 
Lansdowne had suffered one of the settled estates of the family to go into 
_decay—and after his death his successor laid out considerable sums of 
money in repairing the dilapidations of his predecessor. For the recovery 
of these he had no remedy at law ; because the injury was what the law 
terms a personal wrong, and the action for these dies with the offender. 
He accordingly instituted a suit in equity against the representatives of 
the deceased marquis, for repayment out of his assets of the monies 
expended. But the court refused his prayer, alleging that there were 
in its annals no instances of similar applications to be found. In this it 
was mistaken. An analogous case had occurred under the chancellor- 
ship of Lord Cowper ; and he then dismissed the bill, with the broad 
confession that for grievances of this description “ there was no remedy 
either at law or in equity.” This is, however, not a solitary instance ; 
and it is obvious, therefore, that comparatively wide as are the principles 
of equity, they are not yet sufficiently comprehensive for the existing 
wants of society. 
To inquire the best process for securing an adaptation of the laws 
