1828.] Court of Chancery. 231 
construction to the judges of the common law ; and thus subjects the 
parties to all the expence and protracted litigation of an additional trial, 
in order to get a decision upon that with which he was already conversant, 
and just as capable of resolving as the court of law could possibly have 
been. We doubt not the removal of this mutual coyness in either court 
to avail itself of the practice and principles of the other, would be pro- 
ductive of considerable simplicity in the general administration of 
justice ; and, as far as the common law is concerned, we know nothing 
which would so effectually bring it up to a level with the wants of the 
present time.—Referring to a legislative measure, for the purpose of 
accomplishing this result, in common with another for removing doubts 
upon points which now furnish what he terms a constant harvest of liti- 
gation, Mr. Cooper remarks :—“ A gentleman of the greatest experience 
in the court, thinks, with myself, that, in this way, one-fifth part of the 
chancery business might be annihilated.’”—p. 163. Great, however, as 
would be the advantage of thus altering the present absurd postures of 
the two courts, we do not see that it is necessary, in order to achieve 
this, to consolidate their jurisdictions under one tribunal. Under some 
of the foreign codes, and particularly under the Dutch civil code, to 
which we alluded in our former article on the subject, the common law 
judge is intrusted with the exercise of so much of the equitable functions 
as will enable him to suspend, in particular exigencies, the applica- 
tion of the general rules of his own court. This undoubtedly realizes all 
the gain to be produced by close communication between two jurisdic- 
tions taking cognizance of the same common subject—and this we admit 
to be no small advantage. But then, it must be remembered, that 
although intrusting their administration to the same individual, this still 
perpetuates the respective provinces of law and equity in distinct. exist- 
ence ; and it is well worth considering, whether, as the subjects which 
fall within them accumulate, with the accumulating litigation of a great 
country, these provinces will be even capable of sustaining this blended 
administration. 
The functions of the court of equity are not moreover merely correelive 
of the provisions of the common law. We have seen that a large part of 
the jurisdiction of the court is either to supply remedies to grievances in 
which the law furnishes none, or does not furnish that which is required. 
An individual enters into a contract for the sale of an estate, which the 
other party refuses to perform. The doors of the courts of law and 
equity are alike open to the purchaser for redress. If he seek compen- 
sation, however, in the shape of damages for the refusal, he enters the 
former. But suppose nothing less than the possession of the estate will 
satisfy him he goes into equity, for process compelling the vendor to 
execute a conveyance of it to him. It is true that he is driven there 
from the inadequacy of the common law. This is, however, only saying 
that the law does not afford all the remedies his case demands; and it is 
obvious that, in point of fact, the only difference between the two, lies in 
the difference of the remedy. In addition to this, a large part of the 
business of the court is purely agency. Parties in fiduciary situations, as © 
guardians, executors, trustees, &c., find it a convenient mode of relieving 
themselves of the responsibility of their trust, to impose its direction 
upon the Court of Chancery, and accordingly frequently place property 
within the jurisdiction of the court for the mere purpose of acquiring its 
indemnity. ‘« A great deal of the business of the court,” says Mr. Forster, 
