1828.] Court of Chancery. 233 
cellor’s paper for hearing in July 1826, only 27 were appeals from the 
decisions of the commissioners. In the Lord Chancellor’s paper for the 
same month of July, there were sixty-seven petitions, and of these 
Mr. Montague has stated, he believed there were not more-than eight 
which were appeals from the commissioners.” With respect to infants, 
the administration of their affairs originally was the province of a distinct 
court, called the Court of Wards ; and, indeed, it was only upon its 
abolition that that administration has devolved upon the Court of Chan- 
cery. Independently of this, the history of other countries affords us an 
ample precedent for making this a separate subject of jurisdiction. In 
the appendix to the Chancery Commission, there is an account given of 
certain courts, denominated Orphan Courts, which existed in the United 
States for the protection of the properties of infants, in which it is said, 
that the guardians and others, having the management of such proper- 
ties, were compellable in a summary way by mere summons or order, 
to account for them, and to pay into court all monies, from time to time 
coming to their hands. These accounts were regularly settled, and the 
balances paid at stated periods ; so that, on each infant’s attaining majo- 
rity, or being married, the amount was in readiness to be paid over to 
them : and it is added, “ that the expence was so trifling, that it was no 
burthen on very small properties.” 
In thus advocating, however, the policy of a greater subdivision of the 
jurisdiction of the court, let us not be understood as seeking utterly to 
wrest the whole out of the cognizance of the Chancellor. We propose 
still to leave him invested with the appellate jurisdiction to each ; and 
indeed, we have serious doubts whether his personal jurisdiction, instead 
of being an original one with reference to any of the subjects which are 
administered in his court, ought not to be appellate to the whole. It 
seems an absurdity that the first law officer of the state should be engaged 
on subjects, presenting little or no difficulty in decision, but making 
immense demands on his time. Yet, such is, in point of fact, the charac- 
ter of nine-tenths of the causes which are litigated in the court. The 
unravelling of the facts is generally the only difficulty. This once 
accomplished, the law is plain enough ; and surely matters of this kind 
might well enough be adjudicated by individuals of less dignity than 
the chief officer of the court. Under the jurisprudence of France, the 
elucidation of all matters of fact is confined to inferior tribunals. The 
Court of Cassation, which is the court of special appeal to all, decides 
simply upon the law of the cases submitted to it ; and owing mainly to 
this—to the comparative simplicity of their laws—and to the multipli- 
city of their inferior tribunals, we believe such a thing as arrear of 
business is scarcely known to the courts of France. But not only is 
there no arrear, causes are always urged on with so much dispatch, that 
it is not often their litigation exceeds a twelvemonth, while under the 
blessed administration of our Court of Chancery, the author of the Pro- 
ceedings, a practised advocate of the court, states, that he is taking 
“avery favourable view of even a common chancery suit, for the pay- 
ment of a few wretched creditors and legatees, when he announces they 
will receive their debts “at the end of jive years!” And again, he says, 
speaking of the same description of suit, “a daughter, to whom a testator 
leaves a legacy of 10,000/., charged upon his real estate, must wait e7ght 
years before she can receive interest or principal; and, during more 
M.M. New Series. ~—Vou. VI. No. 33. 2H 
