1828. ] Court of Chancery. 379 
might either be to a superior court in bankruptcy, or some other court of 
appeal, in which the Chancellor, alone or associated with other judicial 
dignitaries, was made to preside. Be this as it may, the original juris- 
diction ought undoubtedly to be wrested from him, and provided for in 
some such court as that we have alluded to. Nor are we, in doing this, 
enforcing a mere visionary speculation of our own. The measure has 
been urged by the highest philosophical and practical authorities. Among 
the former it may be sufficient to mention the names of Sir S. Romilly 
and Sir W. Evans. Among the latter, Mr. Montague, Mr. Cooke, the 
Vice Chancellor, and Mr. Roupel. The objections by which it has been 
met do not deserve the name of arguments. The specious absurdity, 
that the Chancellor is the only individual in the state to be trusted with 
the decision of difficult and important matters, would heap upon him 
about one-half the business of the twelve judges. .The “most grave 
and insurmountable objections” of the present Chief Justice of the Court 
of Common Pleas, were, that “if the bankruptcy jurisdiction were 
withdrawn, no greater innovation could be introduced: that bankruptcy 
proceeded from the great seal, and therefore to change it, would be to 
introduce a change in the original jurisdiction.” That “ to change,” is 
“ to introduce a change,” is certainly not exactly a novelty ; but when on 
a recent occasion the salary of that learned judge was raised from its old 
to a higher amount, he would have been puzzled to call the variation by 
any other name than an innovation ; and we do not imagine the change 
produced very “ grave and insurmountable objections” to his profiting 
by the increase. 
- With the separation of bankruptcy must come the separation of lunacy 
from the ordinary and original jurisdiction of the court, with both a 
better distribution of the original and appellate functions of its judges ; 
and in all it should be borne perpetually in mind, that the high powers 
of the great depository of the law, as the Chancellor has been aptly 
termed, ought to be reserved only for cases, in which their previous 
investigation in the inferior tribunals had exhibited them possessed of 
doubt or difficulty. Any thing short of this is a pure waste of the time 
of the suitors and the money of the people. 
With respect to the internal organization of the court, one of the 
greatest of its present grievances is its almost unlimited power of appeal. 
Undoubtedly, the greater the number and variety of minds successively 
brought to the examination of the same subject, the greater is the pro- 
bability that sound conclusion will be the result. There is, however, 
no conceivable number of appellate ‘tribunals, to the establishment of 
which this principle, if admitted to all its consequences, might not give 
sanction ; and it is obvious that the powers and nature of legislation 
require some limit to be affixed to its operation. Now, with proper 
securities for the average abilities of a set of subordinate equity judges, 
we should imagine that one or two appeals, at the outside, might safely 
be rendered conclusive. Yet, under the present constitution of the 
ourt, one cause may become scarcely any thing else than a succession 
erent. After awaiting about two years and a half, from the time 
of its institution, for some adjudication or other, nothing is more com- 
mon, than that the preliminary order in a suit should befor its reference to 
the master, for the ascertainment of certain matters of fact. Upon this 
reference, the master, in due time (to wit, perhaps a twelvmonth) makes 
his report. Against this an appeal may be lodged with the Vice-Chan- 
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