380 Court of Chancery. [Ocr. 
‘cellor, whose decision may be again appealed against to the Chancellor, 
and from the Chancellor in Lincoln’s-inn-hall, an appeal lies against 
this judgment to the Chancellor on the woolsack. Nor is this any thing 
like all—each successive adjudication in the cause is exposed to the 
same process; so that with the spirit of litigation abroad in either party; 
and the requsite funds to carry it through, there is scarce any degree of 
vexation, distraction, and perhaps ruin, which the court does not afford 
the means of visiting on the other. Of the character of the appellate 
tribunal of final resort—that to the House of Lords—it is impossible to 
speak in terms of reprobation sufficiently strong. The least to be said 
for it is, that it is a pompous mockery of justice. Indeed, their own 
incapacity seems to have been so well appreciated by some of them- 
selves, that Lord Erskine, in one of the debates on the subject, with a 
view of securing the presence of an individual or two who would not 
necessarily disgrace it by his ignorance, could see no other remedy for. 
the evil than impounding Lord Eldon and Lord Redesdale in the House: 
To have given efficiency to the tribunal, his lordship should at. the 
time have secured their immortality. Lord Holland was exceedingly 
indignant, that the lords who knew nothing about the law sheuld not 
be treated as participators in its administration‘ This is the first 
time,” said his lordship,. “that the House had been laid prostrate at the 
feet of learned lords, and the first time it had been announced that all 
the other peers were mere cyphers.” As to the position of the House 
with reference to learning (having hitherto heard little about its learn- 
ing) we do not venture to speak ; but we can tell Lord Holland, that, 
however una¢customed to the hearing of wholesome truths may be the 
House he was addressing, that night was very far from being the first time 
on which its own judicial incompetency had been published to the world. 
The conviction is, indeed, too universal to require our enlargement on; 
it, and it is manifest that such a tribunal ought not to continue its exist- 
ence, only to add to the already overgrown appellate processes to which 
all suits in equity are exposed. The dignity of the peerage appears to 
be the the principal obstacle to this improvement; but the time will 
come when peers will no longer have to meet questions of public utility, 
with the opposition of their dignity. 
The propriety of affixing a limitation to the number of counsel to be - 
heard in each cause, rests on the same principles as that of affixing a 
limit to the power of appeal; and we do not hesitate to say, that the 
number frequently employed at present, operates as a serious detriment. 
upon those who have to await their exhaustion for the adjudication of 
their causes. The Chancery Commissioners proposed to restrict the 
number to two in each interest; and if two lawyers cannot be found 
between them, to put the court in possession of all the facts ef the case, 
and the bearings of the law upon it, we should have little left to say 
for the talent, learning, and industry of the English bar. In justice, 
however, to its junior members, and for the interest of the suitors_of the 
court, the whole class of advocates ought to be placed on an equal foot- 
ing. Privileges and immunities seldom bespeak any thing else than, 
injustice to the unprivileged ; and the mischievous privilege enjoyed by. - 
king’s counsel of having all the motions with which they are intrusted 
heard before a single stuff gownsman can open his mouth, is pretty mechs 
ef the same description as most other immunities. 
. There is something in the arrangement of causes for hearmg very. 
Oe 
