1828.] The Moral and Physical Force of freland. 48] 
From the date of their departure to our own times, the French armies 
have been filled with Irish, and a favourite measure, recommended by the 
puny courts of the Pretenders, and sometimes dreamt of by the French 
cabinet, was another invasion of Ireland. Numberless are the memoirs 
and plans of campaigns, drawn up by various military O’s and Mac’s exist 
ing on manuscripts lying in the French archives, in which it is demon- 
strated that the most obvious and prudent policy for France to adopt, 
would be the immediate invasion of their native country. Many causes, 
however, prevented their patriotic wishes from being carried into execu- 
tion. After the peace of Utrecht, France had no power of moving offen- 
sively for some time, and when her strength had _ recovered, the policy 
of her minister, Fleury, was essentially pacific. When she appeared in 
arms in the middle of the last century, she was more occupied, (and not 
very succesfully) in the affairs of Germany than of England ; and though 
the young Pretender turned her attention, languidly, however, to Great 
Britain, his views were of necessity primarily confined to Scotland, 
where his chief connexion lay. In the American war France thought 
more of the West Indies than any thing else ; but the Irish in her service 
continually pressed Ireland upon her attention. In vain, however ; that 
was not her game. The Bourbons felt that they had done quite enough 
in fostering resistance to regal power in America, without bringing it 
into Europe, within easy sail of their own dominions. The revolu- 
tionists had no such scruples, and to them the prayers of the United 
Irishmen were addressed. Tone asked from Carnot—as his countryman, 
1,700 years before, had asked of Agricola—half a legion for the conquest 
of Ireland. We need not bring our history down farther : the attempts 
of Hoche and Humbert are matters of newspaper chronology. 
This propensity to look abroad, is, we believe, unparalleled in the history 
of any other people ; at least, in no other people has it become so dis- 
tinctive a national mark. If Russia attains the ascendancy, which is 
expected, or was expected before this last campaign, she too will, in all 
probability, be supplicated for aid in the internal quarrels of Irish 
faction ; and, we perceive, indeed, that there are some hints thrown out 
already. The reasons for this propensity lie somewhat deeper than the 
trading politicians and journalists of this country would so flippantly and 
unhesitatingly assign.. : 
_ The book before us is devoted exclusively to the purpose of showing 
that Ireland contains in herself all the means, physical, military, financial, 
moral, and political, of being independant of England, and its author 
labours hard to prove that it should look to her own means for working 
out this desirable object. He distinctly exclaims against expecting 
foreign aid :— 
_ © Tfany nation think itself aggrieved, and seek relief, let it look at home for 
cultivation of those powers, which may be equal to the end. Let it not 
_ Fepose upon foreign asisstance—the elements which human sagacity or human 
force cannot direct or control—the winds and the waves—fire—or by its 
absence, frost, may destroy the best calculated hope. Foreign expeditions are 
ever precarious.—The Spanish armada—Deus afflavit, et dissipantur.—Charles 
the Twelfth.—Napoleon arrested by frost—Cambyses and his million buried 
in burning sand— 
“ a while the living hill 
Heaved with convulsive throes—then all was still.”’ 
Without wishing to dispute this most disputable of all positions, one 
M.M. New Series —Vou. VI. No. 35. 3Q 
on 
