— 
1828] A { fairs in General. 511 
establishing herself in the Morea—they will consent to an accommoda- 
tion with their old subjects, and accept a tribute, under the guarantee of 
certain European powers, which, after all that has passed, can with no 
decency be declined. If no accommodation speedily follows, war with 
France is inevitable; and France will prove a much more formidable 
foe than Russia—her resources are substantial and nearer home, as near 
almost as those of Turkey—the difference of a day or two's sail. Both 
parties will be contending, in some respects, on equal terms ; but supe- 
riority of discipline and matériel, on the part of France, will infallibly 
carry the~victory—and then what becomes of Greece? After fighting 
for it, we may be sure France willbe as little disposed to resign it to the 
natives as to restore it to the Turks. 
But have we nothing to do with all this? Shall we suffer France to 
make this beautiful acquisition of the Morea? If we cannot prevent, 
it is surely better not to attempt it ; and the policy of the existing admi- 
nistration, be it the effect of necessity or choice, is obviously not to pre- 
cipitate war ; and that, at all times, is probably the wiser course. More 
good is usually done—in private life, doubtless, and we see not why it 
should not in public—by waiting for events, than by anticipating and 
forcing. More good, we repeat, is done by watching opportunities for 
effective action, than rashly and blindly venturing forward, without 
adequate knowledge of the ground—where the course is not clear, and 
the issue unascertainable. It is too much, because we donot know what: 
the government is actually doing, to take for granted it is doing nothing ; 
and we have no doubt they will not be found neglecting or abandoning 
obvious duties. It is possible the course they take with foreign courts 
may not be effective ; but it is very possible, also, it may be. It is not 
easily to be credited that we are really of so little weight in the political 
scale, as certain debaters would have us believe. Our expectation is, 
that, finally—in the course of the winter, perhaps—matters will be 
arranged, and return pretty much to the position they held before Mr. 
Canning’s interference. The only exception, if exception there should 
be, will be in favour of the Greeks: the Morea will be given up to 
them, subject to a tribute; and the rest of their countrymen, for the- 
present, must remain as before. 
But the Dardanelles! Is it for the dignity of England to submit to 
the exclusions of a blockade? We do not know that she even proposes 
to submit. The Foreign Secretary, it is true, communicates to the 
merchants the fact of the expectation of a blockade ; but, because he 
makes this communication, does it follow that the government will indo- 
lently acquiesce in its legality? If the Secretary was in possession of 
information important to the safety of the shipping, he was bound to 
communicate it. The communication might have been made in different 
terms ; but the inference is unwarrantable, and suited only to serve 
party purposes, to suppose the government acquiescing in the direct 
infraction of a contract. It can scarcely be doubted that remonstrance 
will be made; and as little that Russia, on the instances of both France 
and England, will come back to the terms of her engagement, or to some 
less offensive modification; but for us to go furiously to war before 
remonstrance, is fit only for the Quixotism of the Times, who, on all 
occasions, rather than not fight at all, would tilt at a windmill. » But 
events are dissolving the difficulty ; the Russians are going, and the 
