—  —— — 
1828.] Affairs in General. 621 
his capital, and the season for action is over ; no reinforcenients are heard 
of, and a winter campaign must be an idle thought. The result, then, 
only strengthens our anticipations; and we do not believe the Russians 
will again renew their attempt. The possession of Varna will enable 
them to treat on better conditions—by the exertions of the commission- 
ers of England and France, a bargain will be eventually struck—the 
provinces north of the Danube (which had, in fact, before ceased to 
belong to the Turks) will be yielded up to them in full sovereignty—and 
the troops south of the Danube will be withdrawn, and Varna restored. 
Russia will thus, by this attempt of hers, have withdrawn the veil— 
made manifest her ambitious projects—shewn her real feebleness—and 
proved her former formidableness to have rested in the union and second- 
ing of others ;—she will have betrayed her state-secret, and the fears of 
Europe be quenched, as we said before, for half a century. 
_ Of the blockade of the Dardanelles we hear no more, nor are we 
likely now. We question if even it ever was seriously thought upon, or, 
at all events, only in prospective—should they reach, that is, the neigh- 
bourhood of the capital. The Morea is now at length completely cleared 
of the Egyptians—intelligence has just arrived of the surrender up of 
Patras. Will the activity of the allies stop at this point? There is no 
calculating. The confederacy formed by the treaty of the 6th of July 
is one of the most anomalous things that ever was heard of in the 
records of diplomacy. It neither makes war, nor keeps peace. It is 
alliance, and no alliance. With the exception of the affair ef Navarino,. 
the parties have never acted fairly together; and then it was the com- 
manders who united, and not the governments. One of the parties makes 
open war on its own private account, and still professes itself a member 
of the peace-compelling confederacy. This, no doubt, the Russians had 
a right to do, if the others chose to consent; but why should England 
and France keep up the ambigucus and discreditable connexion ?- When 
a partner in a mercantile house enters upon private speculations, or con- 
nects himself with another house, he is usually got rid of; and the 
moment Russia opened her private scheme, independently of the general 
purposes of the confederacy, she should have been dismissed, and not 
suffered to undertake an adventure, the results of which were likely to 
be at variance with the object of the union, and certain of producing no 
advantage to the firm. Since Navarino, indeed, Russia has scarcely 
taken any share in the old concern; and. England and France have 
plainly bad great difficulty in understanding one another. First, the 
English commander concludes a treaty with the Pacha of Egypt, by the 
terms of which the Egyptians were forthwith to evacuate the Morea, 
leaving—for what final purpose is incomprehensible—1,200 troops to 
occupy the fortresses. Then come the French, with a force of ten or 
fifteen thousand men, the commander of which superintends the evacua- 
tion ; and, moreover, compels the fortresses to surrender, and the 1,200 
to take wing after their brethren. The French commander then prepares 
to advance to Athens, to expel thence, in like manner, the Turkish gar- 
rison ; when the English step in, and forbid the execution of his design. 
The French long to be a-doing, because they have with them where- 
withal to sweep the north of Greece of the Turks; but the English, 
nobody knows why, oppose any farther movement. The object of the 
original confederacy was confessedly to force a peace, or at least a cessa-~ 
tion of hostilities ; and how was this to be accomplished, but either by 
