122 Debtors. [ Ave. 
easy to discriminate. The proof is so often solely in the breast of the 
debtor; he alone can tell’ whether, when he incurs a debt, he knows he 
has forthcoming resources, or probable grounds for believing himself 
able to repay at a given time. It is only by inference—partly by guess 
and partly by evidence, that we are able to distinguish between debt 
and fraud. But does the /aw make any distinction? Does the law 
inquire first into the fact? No; it imprisons forthwith—without i inquiry 
either before or after—at the demand and will of the creditor—right or 
wrong; and here it is that we complain, and justly complain. 
If the debt be a fraud, prosecute and punish it as a fraud; if it be a 
debt, a debt in the common acceptance and common apprehension of 
mankind, treat it as a debt and only as a debt. Well, but it is treated as 
adebt. A debt, ifnot a crime, is at least an injury; and for that injury 
imprisonment is inflicted—it is the remedy the law gives—the means of 
enforcing satisfaction—no more ; as soon as that satisfaction is made, 
the imprisonment is at an end. 
Then, we say, the means are iniquitous—the remedy is imappro- 
priate, and the law should be changed. The imprisonment proceeds 
manifestly on the false supposition that debt must be a fraud, or, at 
least, that the debtor can pay and will not, and therefore must be com- 
pelled. But the truth is, nine times out of ten, the sole reason of 
non-payment is inability, not perverseness. Perverseness, indeed !—the 
thought is absurd. What mortal, with agrain of spirit, with a shade of 
right feeling, with any sense of independence, to say nothing of any 
sentiment of honour or justice, but shrinks from the insolent tone of a 
creditor? The man must be insane or an idiot who subjects himself to 
the impertinent, but just demand of a claim, which he has it in his power 
to prevent. 
No; the appropriate remedy is not imprisonment of the person, but 
seizure of his property: but if there be no property—what, would you 
imprison where there really is no property? Recollect, we suppose 
the absence of fraud. Of what use will the imprisonment be? Where 
there is nothing, nothing can be had. Oh, but imprisonment, though 
it will not bring payment, will have a tendency to deter others. Then 
you treat it as acrime; and our question is, how a debt ought to be 
treated? We say, the seizure of the debtor's property ‘is the appro- 
priate remedy—the sole remedy ; and where there is no property there 
can be no remedy—no reparation. 
The debtor is able to pay, or he is not. If he be able to pay, the 
natural, the appropriate remedy, as we have said, is to attach his property. 
Of what use is the person? None, you allow, but to enforce payment. 
But if he be so disposed as to preter arrest to payment, the probability 
must surely be, that he will prefer imprisonment to payment. Of what 
service then is the power of arrest? No, the right and unquestionable 
course is seizure of the goods ; and the activity and acuteness of the law 
should be directed to render property of every kind easily accessible 
and promptly available. If the debtor be unable, which we insist is the 
general fact, of what use again is the person? None—none whatever 
to the creditor; but too probable ruin to the debtor. It is a case; where 
the creditor must submit to the inconveniencies attending his own impru- 
dence. But the creditor may have no blame to charge himself with ; his 
simplicity has been imposed upon; the debtor has made false represen- 
tations. Very well, then it becomes a case of pe and let your laws 
be pointed to detect and punish that fraud. ed 
