1826. ] fr l65 
ON THE PROPER USE OF THE EYES. 
« Quam multi sunt qui, oculis patentibus, nihil vident.” 
Ir is an odd whim of the philosophers that the nostrils were made for 
taking of snuff; that the bridge of the nose exists for the gestation 
of spectacles ; and that legs were purposely divaricated, that they 
might wear breeches. Much more plausible is the idea that heads were 
created for hats; seeing that so many people make no other use of that 
part of their person than to employ the hatter. This likewise accords 
with the dictum of that unlucky man, who vowed to heaven that he 
believed, if he had been bred a hatter, men would have taken to being 
born without heads! But of all the absurd applications of the doctrine 
of final causes, none is more extravagant than the notion, so generally 
prevalent, that “eyes were made to see withal.” How men, and wise 
ones, too, should have fallen upon such an error, passes my powers 
of conjecture: for it is quite clear, that if they really looked beyond 
their noses, they could not so have stumbled at the threshold. ‘True it 
is, that the structure of these organs exhibits an admirable adaption of 
parts to optical purposes. The form of the crystalline lens, the density 
of the several humours, the light-absorbing blackness of the pigmentum 
nigrum, the lucid transparency of the cornea, the delicate irritability of 
the iris, and a thousand other coincident phenomena, have been noticed 
by every possible professor of physico-theology, as conspiring to render 
the eye a perfect camera obscura. Yet the good gentlemen entirely 
overlook, that their whole sorites depends upon the reality of the supposed 
function of the optic nerve ; and nobody yet can boast of having caught 
that pulpy membrane in the act of seeing. That the optic nerve sees is 
a mere inference; but what, I pray you, does the subtilest induction 
weigh against matter-of-fact ? and we all know that this same matter-of- 
fact is directly against their hypothesis. On this point I might content 
myself with referring to the conscience of the reader, requesting him 
(with all that deferential solemnity which befits the occasion) to lay his 
heart on his hand,—I mean his hand on his heart,—and declare, on 
the honour of a gentleman, what he thinks on the subject. Were 
the matter put to a general vote, and no corrupt interest should arise to 
convert it into a close borough question, “ the noes” would have it, “all 
Lombard Street to a China orange.” However, as conscience in these 
times is but a ticklish commodity, it may perhaps be best to take 
the onus probandi upon myself, rather than distress a good customer by 
too trying an appeal; and to this end, I shall proceed to state such 
pregnant instances and such cogent reasons as will satisty the most 
sceptical, that, even in the ordinary affairs of life, few persons really look 
before them, or are at all governed by impressions derived through the 
instrumentality of the eyes. In the first place, then, I shall take leave 
to cite in my behalf the testimony of a proverb, not less remarkable 
for its elegance than for its truth: namely, that “seeing is believing, 
but feeling has no fellow ;” a proverb that plainly indicates how accidental 
and imperfect is the relation of the eye to real knowledge, and that 
teaches, like the miser in the comedy, the superior confidence due to the 
“touch, touch, touch.” Let me, however, not be mistaken. Ido not 
wish to be understood as asserting that men do not sometimes see with 
“their ‘eyes, since such happens to be the arrangement of membranes, 
humours and nerves, that the thing is possible, though doubtless 
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