460 ' RESOURCES, &C. OF RUSSIA. 



of valour. He conceived that, by the scheme in question, this evil 

 would be in a great measure remedied; while at the same time it 

 promised g-reat advantages in a pecuniary point of view. The sol- 

 dier/ by being permanently fixed to his natal place, would naturally 

 feel attached to his native country, and fight more willingly and gal- 

 lantly when called to the scene of action. The advantages which 

 the project promised to realize, while they elated Alexander and his 

 government beyond measure, at the same time created no small 

 alarm to the other Powers of Europe. Though not a complete 

 failure, it has by no means verified the anticipations to which it 

 gave rise. It does not commend itself to the Russians them- 

 selves ; the nobility are almost to a man invetei-ately hostile to it, 

 the regular army abhor it, and the peasantry regard it with unqua- 

 lified dislike. Nicholas and his government, however, still cling to it 

 with all the fondness of a first love. What may be the eventual 

 influence of the organization of these colonies, on the destinies of 

 Russia, is more than we or any body else can undertake to say with 

 confidence ; but, judging from the temper with which they are at 

 present regarded by the people of all ranks and classes in the empire, 

 we should deem it much more likely that they will prove the instru- 

 ments of mischief rather than of good to the northern Autocrat. It is 

 not at all improbable that, if Nicholas persist in keeping them up in 

 defiance of ihe wishes of his people, they will rise up in open insur- 

 rection throughout the empire, and thus prove the destruction of both 

 monarch and government. 



The Russian navy is not very large, nor, though it were, is it likely, 

 for reasons to be mentioned anon, ever to become very formidable to 

 the other European powers. In 1805, according to Czome, and 

 other authors on the statistics of that empire, it consisted of thirty- 

 two ships of the line, eighteen frigates, fifty-nine small craft, and 226 

 galleys, which, if put together, only make a total of 355 sail. The 

 number of cannon carried by the Russian navy in the above year 

 was 4428. The sailors then numbered 35,507 ; the naval artillery" 

 was 4,000 ; and the marines 8,262. In 1813, the navy consisted of 

 280 sail, which were manned by 32,040 hands ; so that instead of 

 increasing in strength it rather diminished in the eight intervening 

 years. The annual expense of maintaining the navy is 9,000,000 

 rubles. 



We have already said that there exists no ground for apprehend- 

 ing that Russia will ever become a formidable naval power. The 

 reasons are these: — First, whatever may be the cause, whether 

 it be the corruptible nature of the wood, or the rotting energies of 

 the Baltic water, which is comparatively fresh, the fact is that no 

 Russian ship can be made to last above six years without undergoing 

 extensive repairs, and even with all the repairs which can be made 

 she will not be fit for sea above fifteen years. Secondly, the com- 

 paratively limited extent of sea coast belonging to Russia is another 

 insuperable barrier to her becoming a naval power of any conse- 

 quence. The only sea-port in European Russia open to the ocean 

 is Archangel ; but it has no connection with European seas except by 

 the way of North Cape, which last lies in so high a latitude that 



