466 RESOURCES, &C., OF RUSSIA. 



all the physical attributes of good soldiers, but they lack what is 

 vastly more important, the moral requisites for successful warfare in 

 a civilized country. They are competent to the endurance of great 

 privations and fatigue. They have an ample stock of obstinacy and of 

 brute strength ; but they fight like so many machines. They are utter 

 strangers to the soul-inspiring influence of patriotism : love of coun- 

 try is an emotion of which they know nothing. Hence it often oc- 

 curred, in the late campaign in Poland, that they were discomfited by 

 the Poles, when twice or thrice the number of the latter. 



Besides, there is not that attachment to their generals on the 

 part of the Russian soldiery which is of so much consequence in any 

 great enterprise against a civilized power. The generals of Rus- 

 sia are almost invariably chosen from the nobility, between 

 whom and the peasantry there is an impassable gulf. The no- 

 bles look down on the lower classes with as much contempt as if they 

 were so many beasts of burden. In such a case it is out of the 

 question to expect that the common sjldiers should evince that rea- 

 diness to anticipate and to act according to the wishes of their ge- 

 nerals which prove of so much advantage in other European armies. 

 To this, in a great measure, do we ascribe that miserable deficiency 

 in military tactics for which the Russians have been long notorious. 



But to our minds it is as certain that Russia will not, for many years 

 to come, dream of making a hostile incursion into any of the countries 

 of Europe, as it is plain the invasion would be unsuccessful. The 

 Autocrat needs not at this time of day to be told — his own experience 

 has lessoned him so far on the subject — how difficult a thing it is, and 

 how perilous to the stability of his throne and government, to fit out 

 an effective army for foreign service. First of all, the thinness of the 

 population, the physical state of the country, the diversity of lan- 

 guages spoken in the empire, and the variety of tribes of which his 

 subjects are composed — all these are formidable obstacles to his 

 raising and concentrating, and then managing with effect, such an 

 army. Then there is the want of the sinews of war. What a world 

 of difficulty it lately cost Nicholas to get a loan of 30,000,000 rubles 

 negociated ! How much more diflicult would it be for him to pro- 

 cure the immense sum which would be indispensable in such 

 Herculean undertaking as the subjugation of any of the great powers 

 of Europe, or any of the smaller ones, when aided by Great IJritain, 

 France,' Austria, and Prussia ! He perceives, besides, that he does 

 not reign in the hearts of his subjects, and that his army constitutes 

 the only, or at least die chief, protection of his person, and the prop 

 of his throne and government. To send therefore the greater part 

 of his soldiers on a foreign expedition — which would of course be 

 necessary in such a case— would be an experiment which the Au- 

 tocrat has too much good sense and too strong an instinct of self- 

 preservation to be foolish enough to make. To speak a truth, it requires 

 no superior penetration to discover that the absence of that portion 

 of his troops which were lately campaigning in Poland was the source 

 of no small inquietude and apprehension to him. Hence his edifying 

 anxiety to get them back — whenever that could be done without abso- 

 lutely disgracing his flag— as evinced in his late proclamations to the 



