| 
HISTORY OF EU:ROPE, 
the warmeft and moft determined 
Zealots in the caufe; nor were they 
awakened from this delufion till the 
bufinefs was over, when their opi- 
nion and action were become as 
~ nfelefs as their repentance. 
But that great power which over- 
ruled all others in the kingdom, that 
turbulent metropolis which contain- 
ed within its old walls a very nu- 
merous and a moit peculiar nation, 
was not only fufficient to turn but 
directed the management of the 
{cale in all cafes as it liked. Paris, 
therefore, little needed the aid of 
Rennes in Brittany, and feveral other 
of the more confiderable cities and 
towns, which having received the 
fame republican bias, were, how- 
ever inferior in ftrength, fcarcely 
lefs zealous in the caufe. 
_ One of the queftions which arofe 
upon this fubject, and which was the 
longeft and the moft violently agi- 
tated, both within and without the 
aflembly, was that relative to the 
king’s veto, or negative, upon the 
pafling of laws. 
between the two parties upon this 
queftion was fo wide, that it feemed 
fearcely poflible they could ever 
meet or unite; for while one brought 
ftrong reafons to fhew that this au- 
thority in the crown was indifpen- 
fably neceflary to the public intereft, 
in order to preferve a check upon 
the tumultuary nature of public af- 
femblies, and prevent their pafling 
not only without due confideration, 
but under the influence perhaps of 
the moft fudden and outrageous paf- 
fions, laws, which from their abfur- 
_dity, their iniquity, or impolicy, 
might draw on national difgrace, 
public injuftice, or even foreign 
danger. On the other fide, the re- 
taining of this power in the king’s 
hands, it was reprefented, would be 
The difference. 
[35 
the means of overthrowing every 
thing that had yet been done for the 
liberty and good of the people; 
that by this negative, without af- 
figning reafon or motive for his 
conduét, he might obftrué thofe 
meafures which were of the higheft 
utility to the people, merely to fa- 
vour the intrigues of his court, or 
the machinations of his minifters 5 
that by thus impeding or arrefting 
the operations of the aflembly, 
the great work of regeneration, 
which the people now fo confi- 
dently expected, would be ren- 
dered impracticable, and all their 
hopes fruftrated ; that if the ill 
effects of this dangerous power did 
not even immediately take place, 
they would not be the lefs certain 
when the proper feafon arrived for 
their operation ; that when the pre- 
fent vigilance of the people and 
their reprefentatives was relaxed, 
and means ufed to lull them into a 
fatal fecurity, then the king might 
fuddenly, at his pleafure, inflict a 
paralytic ftroke upon the legiflative 
body, which would difable and ren- 
der it totally ufelefs. And that, in 
fact, this veto was a never-failing 
inftrument of tyranny, and the moit 
odious and dangerous relick of an- 
cient defpotifm which could poffibly 
be retained. 
The queftion was -branched out 
into feveral parts. After they had 
been occupied in the firft inftance 
to make fuch provifion as fhould 
prevent the operation of the veto 
with refpect to the aéts of the pre- 
fent affembly, the clear difcernment 
of Mounier fhewed that this was 
mere waite of time, the fubject not 
admitting of a queftion; for the 
prefent affembly being appointed by 
the nation, for the {pecial purpoi: 
of framing a conflitution, it was 
[C2] thereby 
