HISTORY OFEUROPE. 



distress. Reflecting on these fects, 

 they naturally infened, that liaving 

 triumphed over this powerful ene- 

 my in the days of his greatest force 

 and union, they niio;lit reason.ibly 

 presume on his iniibility to oppose 

 them, while distracted by internal 

 feuds, and seemingly rent to pirces 

 by the rancours and animo- 

 sities that characterized the par- 

 ties dividing the nation, whi'h 

 had extinguished all sentiments ot 

 humanity, and rendered tlien iiicx.- 

 brably bent on their mutual de- 

 struction. But while the coalesced 

 powers eagerly coutemplatcd (lie 

 divisions and distractions of t!ie 

 French iWtion, they lost sight of 

 those se_-ds of mistrust and suspicion 

 that were profoundly sown among 

 themselves. The plan to reduce 

 "France to its own limits, v*as at- 

 tended with coli.iteral views, that 

 necessarily tended to promote jea- 

 lousies of each other amnngs^t its 

 enemie£ ; and ro break the bouds 

 of the alli;mce they had formed to 

 jjrevent the daiiire.rs appreliended 

 from the aggrandisement of France. 

 This spirit of reciprocal suspicion 

 did not however manifest itself to 

 any extent during tiie, first cam- 

 |xiign in Flanders in the year 1/93. 

 The warmth with which hostilities 

 were at the commencement prose- 

 cuted against a peo[;!e that avowed 

 themselves the enemies to all riiigs, 

 kept alive the determination to co- 

 bperate vigorously against theiii. 

 But the successes of the allies on 

 their first entering into action, the 

 repeated defeats of the Frendi ar- 

 mies, and the rcductioii of some of 

 their strongest towns, induced the 

 fcoalesced po".vers lo imagine '.hat tne 

 comp'etioa of their designs would 

 hot meet with great dijficnliit s. 

 Jlence they overlooked tiic neces- 



sity of acting with the firmest and 

 m<?st indissoluble concord. Instead 

 of remaining in that compactness of 

 strength which had procured them 

 their lirst advantages, they thougiit 

 tiiemsclves able to divide their ope- 

 r.Jtions. Thus, by separating their 

 force, they i"endsred i t inetf'ecUial for 

 tiie great and principal pilrpose they 

 primarily proposed, and lost the on- 

 ly opportunity of accomplishing it 

 which they coitld reasonably expect. 

 I'he close of the can-!paign of 

 l/fjS in the low countries, let't the 

 French armies in possession of sp 

 many advantages, that the most ex- 

 pert in military afiairs, were con- 

 vinced that they would retain their 

 superiority in the campaign th.it 

 was approacliing. I'his opinion was 

 corroborafed by the ir successes on 

 ilie Rhine, and on the other fron- 

 tiers of France, and above all by 

 the lotaJ suppression of the various 

 insurrections against the republi- 

 can government in so many pro- 

 vinces of that country. The dili- 

 gence and activity with which that 

 government jmrsued its measures, 

 the vigour which a lim.lied the of- 

 lice.-s and sjldiers of its numeroii? 

 armies, the abilities of the many 

 Commanders that were c'dntinually 

 i-tarting up to notice, the iiidefatiga- 

 ble exertions (.^l all men employed 

 in the public service, struck their 

 enemies with astonishment. How- 

 ever inimical to the principU-s that 

 actuitted the French, their most de- 

 termined adversaries could not for- 

 bear admiring the courage and ca- 

 pacity of tlK>e who were at the 

 head of that nation. Tht opening 

 of the campaign in the year 1/94, 

 phiinly shewed how resolutely the 

 French were bent, not only to pre- 

 serve the advantages they had 

 gained, bat to carry them to the 

 i/ 2 utmost 



