ANNUAL REGISTER, ll04. 



utmost extent their arms would 

 enable ihcm. The approaching 

 year seemed pregnpnt with events 

 that would decide the fate of 

 France, and eventually that of all 

 Europe. Nor did the generality 

 scruple to predict, that however 

 adverse fortune had proved to the 

 allied powers, they were still 

 doomed to greater calamities. The 

 piodigious eftbrls of the French 

 government evinced how strongly 

 they were persuaded, that on the 

 itsue of this campaign thecorifirma- 

 tion or the destruction of the Re- 

 public would entirely depend. In 

 order to secure a system which they 

 considered as superior to all others, 

 and to which their attachment in- 

 creased in pi'oportion to the endea- 

 vours of their enemies to destroy 

 <t, they loaded (henation with every 

 species of burthen and hardship for 

 its preservation. 



The military list exhibited by 

 France to the e\es oi Europe for 

 the }ear 1/94, was such as to oc- 

 casion the most serious alarm to the 

 coalition. The whole strength 

 they had been able to collect for a 

 contest in which they were so 

 deeply concerned, and the decision 

 of which was so quickly approach- 

 ing, d-d not oxceed 360,000 men ; 

 while thetroops sent into the fieldby 

 France a'one, more tlian doubled 

 that uuniber. But France lelied as 

 much, if not more, on the temper of 

 the men that toc.iposed its armies. 

 Tutored by those wrh.o raised tjiem, 

 and no less by those who were em- 

 ployed to teach then' military di-.- 

 ciplinein the maxims of republica- 

 nism, so violently predoniiiiaiU in 

 France, they tooK t!p arms with far 

 olhervicws and ideas than those that 

 net 1 ia( cd t he ioulirrs of llie combined 



powers. Obedience to the will 

 and orders of their rulers was the 

 sole motive that actuated these ; 

 whereas the French soldiers went 

 to battle, .some of them, animated 

 with (he deadliest sentiments of 

 revenge against men whom they 

 looked upon as the base instru- 

 ments of tyranny and oppression ; 

 others, by the hope of rising in the 

 army, and acquiring both fame and 

 fortune ; and all ot them by a de- 

 sire of maintaining the military re- 

 putation of Frenchmen. 



Delivered from those anxieties 

 which had arisen from the intestine 

 commotions, which had proved so 

 difficult to be suppressed, the repub- 

 lican administration was now at li- 

 berty to exert the whole strength 

 of France in those quarters where 

 its successes would prove most deci- 

 sive. These were the low coun- 

 tries, and those lying towards the 

 Rhine. The former appearing 

 the more important scene of action, 

 it was chiefly there tliat the French 

 proposed to make the greatest ef- 

 forts. The flow er of the German 

 and British armies being stationed 

 in that country, with the double 

 view of protecting it from the inva- 

 sion of France, and converting it 

 into the principal d/'put of arms, 

 from whence to annoy the French, 

 it became the chief object of these 

 to frustrate both those designs, and 

 especially the latter. The preced- 

 ing campaign in those parts had 

 terminated by a general action that 

 had covered the French troops with 

 particular glory. They had de- 

 feated in thp battle of Maubeuge, 

 t)i;jt lasted two entire days, the 

 most illustrious comm.ander in the 

 ailtcd armies. Prince Cobourg, who 

 had taken so advantageous a posi- 

 tion. 



