12 ANNUAL REGISTER, 1794. 



which proved most offensive and 

 alarming to the isripcrial court, was 

 the opposition of the Prussian en- 

 Toy to tlie proposal of raising the 

 people of the frontiers in a mass. 

 This was described as a servile, and 

 no less perilous imitation of the 

 French. So violent was the disapr 

 probation he expressed, that he ex- 

 plicitly declared, in his master's 

 ■name, that if such a measure was 

 adopted, Prussia would immediately 

 renounce the confederacy, and re- 

 call its troops from all further ser- 

 vice in that cause. 



These various differences of sen- 

 timent in the princes and states 

 of Germany, greatly debilitated the 

 efforts that w-ere intended to be 

 made against France. It soon ap- 

 peared that, from this want of una- 

 nimity, nothing very decisive would 

 be concluded on, and that, howe- 

 ver serious and sincere some of the 

 parties concerned in the war miglit 

 be, there were as many who felt a 

 repugnance to its prosecution, and 

 who could not therefore, notwith- 

 standing their ostensible concur- 

 rence with those whom they were 

 fearful to disoblige, be reputed 

 hearty and cordial in their assent to 

 a measure which they were well 

 known to disapprove. 



The intelligence of this change 

 of disposition in the Germanic 

 powers, but especially the defection 

 of Prussiafrom thealliance of which 

 it had, in concert with Austria, been 

 the primary promoter, roused the 

 indignation of that numerous and 

 powerful party in G.-eat Britain, 

 who had so warmly abetted the 

 views of the confederacy. Fully 

 aware that a good understanding 

 between the courts of Vienna and 

 Berlin war. indispensably requisite 

 for any effectual prosecution of 



hostilities against France, no me- 

 thods were left untried to prevent 

 a secession between them. But 

 mere exhortations and reasonings 

 only, were lost upon a ministry 

 so keenly intent on the promotion of 

 its particular views as that of Prus- 

 sia. The obligations of a treaty 

 framed on its own principles and 

 coinciding with all its purposes, had 

 vanished before the conviction 

 that the ends of that treaty 

 were no longer attainable. The 

 only character it now determined 

 toactin,was thatof a subsidiary ally. 

 Nor was it without an enormous 

 expenditure that the British gor 

 vcniment was able to prevail on 

 the Prussian monarch toiict in that 

 capacity. No less than 2,200,000/. 

 would be the sum accepted by his 

 mmistry. In consideration of this, 

 it engaged to furnish the com- 

 bined armies with 60,000 men. 

 But this engagement was accom-: 

 panied by a clause which, in the eye 

 of impartial politicians, rendered 

 it almost nugatory. This large 

 body of troops was to be under the 

 sole command of a Prussian Gencr 

 ral, appointed by the King of Prus- 

 sia himself. Tlius it exclusively 

 depended upon him to regulate the 

 motioBs of these troops ; which at 

 his sole and uncontrouled option 

 were to be made useful or inactive. 

 This implicit confidence was ge-r 

 nerally deemed very injudiciously 

 placed by the British public. In 

 truth, after such proofs of an under-? 

 standing between Prussia and 

 France, it was a mark of a childish 

 weakness. The suspicions that 

 had arisen of an amicable disposi- 

 tion to each other in the French 

 and Prussians, wereopenly expressed 

 in every country in Europe ; and 

 people were utterly at a loss to ex- 

 plain 



