23 



ANNUAL RE^lStER, 17^4. 



tionsof Prince Cobourg. His plan 

 •was, it seems, to collect whatever 

 could be found in good order aud 

 condition of the allied troops, and 

 ■with these to venture one courage- 

 ous trial of fortune with the enemy; 

 His superiority in number was 

 visibly the principel cause of his 

 success : and if, through skilful dis- 

 positions, this superiority could be 

 guarded against, the chances of war 

 would remain equal, and hopes 

 might be justly entertained of giv- 

 ing battle to the enemy with suc- 

 cess. But this, in the opinion of 

 many, was a very perilous scheme. 

 The numbers of the Fiench were 

 continually brought forwards with 

 so much arrangement, expedition*, 

 and dexterity, that it was impossible 

 to avoid them. Their tactics were so 

 ordered as to maintain a constant 

 succession of attacks, which could 

 not by any art be prevented : thus, 

 whatever numbers they might 

 bring into the field, they were all 

 brought into action, and rendered 

 of certain utility. 



We have been repeatedly as- 

 sured by ditferent persons, well in- 

 formed on the subject of French 

 affairs at the present period, tliat 

 the militaiy plans and stratagems 

 cf the French armies in tlic pre- 

 sent campaign, were not so often 

 formed by the Generals, though 

 unquestionably men of great genius 

 and ability, as by the joint (if not 

 .siiperior) talents of a military com- 

 mittee established at Paris, for tlie 



pfculiar purpose of directing all the 

 grand operations of war on the im- 

 mense frontiers of France in a sys- 

 tematic, and by the aid of the tele- 

 graph, an almost instantaneous 

 rtianrier. This committee was 

 treated by Robcspierrfe in his own 

 way. The members who com- 

 posed it were placed, arid ih fact 

 confined in the Thuilleries j whi- 

 ther all kinds of military charts 

 were brought to them from the 

 war office, and all the military me- 

 moirs and observations of the most 

 celebrated c^ommanders that had 

 been produced by France. In the 

 antlchamber of these gentlemen 

 there was a number of aid-des- 

 camps, and a multitude of couriers, 

 for the purpose of transmitting such 

 orders as could not be communi* 

 cated by the telegraph. A hint 

 was given them, that in case their 

 measures should not prove success, 

 ful, the guillotine was at their ser- 

 vice. In this manner the cunning 

 tyrant contrived to avail himself 

 of the abilities and experience of 

 many officers warmly attached to 

 the royal family and the old go- 

 vernment. It was of officers of 

 this class indeed that the commit- 

 tee principally consisted ; and,what 

 is also very remarkable, among the' 

 members of this committee^ there 

 were several gentlemen who had 

 offered their services to the army 

 under the French princes in 1/93, 

 but were rejected on the score of 

 their not belonging to the roy- 



* Among (lUier ingenious inventions in flic art of war, a contrivance had b^ 

 this time been t'allt'i on fyr sending reinforcements of men from one plate to ano- 

 ther on sudden and gre;it emergencies, with great cclsrity and without fatigue^ 

 Itseeraed, like otlier inventions of great importHnce, very simple and obvious too? 

 after it was invented. It was no other than to take the assistance of coaches and! 

 other wheel carriages. In thi?, as in oihc-r military improvements, the French 

 have been imitated by their neighbours. 



alisl 



