HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



185 



quiesce in their doctrines, and to 

 follow their example. With a go- 

 vernnient and people acting with 

 such principles, no peace was prac- 

 ticable. The enthusiastic t'my of 

 the French was such in the propa- 

 gation of thei; principles, and in 

 the detcrininatioii to yield notliirig 

 they had gained, and to recQver all 

 they had lost in their efforts to pro- 

 pagate them, that Great Britain 

 must, in order to obtain th:it peace 

 _ so strongly recommended by the 

 unthinking, and by her secret ene- 

 mies, consent to restore at once 

 whatever had been won by her 

 prowess from this common dis- 

 -tiuber of the peace of Europe, 



Jwilhout indemnilication for ex- 

 pence or loss. She must also tamely 

 submit to the cession of all the 

 countries France had seized from 

 ber neighbours. Were those terms 

 10 be endured? Did the History 

 of Europe afford the precedent of 

 any war since her civilization, 

 whet'ein the victor was allowed to 

 ' retain all he had taken, and to re- 



^ cover all he had lost ? Such a treaty 

 was yet to be discovered j and such 

 demands could proceed only from 

 a spirit of vanity, insolence, and 

 rapacity that ought to be manfully 

 resisted. But were Great Britain, 

 .in conjunction with her allies, to 

 condescend to sue') meanness, 

 *,wouid it secure them from farther 

 3'isult? A prostrate enemy waspro- 

 crbially an object tof contempt, 

 and would always be^trod upon 

 B«X)ner tlian a resolute .foe jliat 

 stood hi| ground to the last.^iu:h, 



, «hftwever, was the presunjptiDn of 



the French, ih^ liie Conjiention 



' id made it a capital o^'nc-e^iii 



■■ man to propose the aL'coptance 



y other terms. Kut, on a Sup-. 



- jXk/jition that the party ruling for' 



the moment should relax from this 

 arrogance, would the supplanting 

 party ratify such a measure ; would 

 it not rather avail itself of such a 

 circumstance, as a pretence for sus- 

 pecting its predecessors as violators 

 of the national honour, and of the 

 laws enacted for its support? A 

 treaty thus framed in contradic- 

 tion to these, would of course be 

 deemed a. nullity. Bette'r, there- 

 fore, to make use of the arms we 

 have taken up, than to lay them 

 down witJi so little security against 

 the necessity of resuming them, 

 when less prepared for action than 

 we are at present. But the fact 

 was, that no peace could be ex- 

 pected while France continued in 

 itsrevolutionary state. Those who 

 governed the French were inflamed 

 by maxims subversive of every sys- 

 tem oj" ^jT)vernment that had pre- 

 vailed hitherto, not only in Eu- 

 rope, but in every part of the globe. 

 They were, at the same time, un- 

 der a conviction, that France, by 

 her arms and by her intrigues, was 

 adequate to the task of subverting 

 theiij all. Urged by this persua- 

 sioniVthey were entirely averse to 

 peace, and wholly intent on carry- 

 ing forwards w hat they styled the 

 great work of the regeneration of 

 mankind. What was still worse, 

 they had succeeded in converting 

 , the French themselves into the 

 rankest enthusiasts. The people 

 at large were not the tame and 

 obedient, but tlie zealous and vio- 

 lent instiuraepts of their governors, 

 ?md seconded their measures with 

 the most .active promptitude and 

 fidelity: I'ill such a fatal delusifm 

 was rooted out of the land, France 

 ought to be c.onsidertd as a coun- 

 try. infi-cte4 with a -pestilence ; of 

 uT^clrit bcho\ ed all its neighbour* 



to 



