HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



209 



ought to be omitted by Great Bri- 

 tain, in conjunction with its allies, 

 t> reduce so dangerous a people 

 vithin boumlSj and to inimble 

 tliein so completely, as to deprive 

 tijem both of the inclination and 

 power to disturb the peace of Eu- 

 rope. It had been in/uiuated tijat 

 the whole strength of the confe- 

 deracy was unequal to such a laskj 

 hut that was the language of de- 

 ppandency. France ipight make 

 a long and desperate resisJa.ice ; 

 but the resoiirce<; cf the coalition 

 v.ould, if eniplojxd with vigour 

 and unanimity, enable it to hold 

 put longer than France, and ob- 

 lige that haughty people to listen 

 to reasonable terms. 



Mr. Fox, in reply to the argu- 

 jiients adducedby ministry, asserted 

 that the precedinr:; campaign did 

 by no means deserve the epithet 

 Cif successful. Our failure at Dun- 

 .kirk and expulsion from Toulon, 



' were sufficient to silence all pre- 

 sences to success. The relinqulsh- 



,^Jng of Toulon was inexcusable. 

 After pledging the honcur of the 

 jiation to exert every endeavour 

 1o retain It, ininistry ought to have 

 provided a sufHcient force to repel 

 the attacks of the besiegers ; where- 

 as the Ktrength employed in its de- 

 fence was so inconsiderable, that 



' no doubt subsisted of its inability 

 to oppose the force which the 

 iTrench government was preparing 

 against il. The retention of Tou- 

 lon was a duty of the first impor- 

 jtance. Had it been put into an 

 effettual posture of defence, the 

 condition of France was such at 

 that time, as to afford well founded 

 hopes of a powerful insurrection 

 of the royal party in the southern 

 parts of that kingdom. Such was 

 the language of the enemies to the 

 Vol. XXXVJ. 



Convention at that time ; and it 

 behoved ministry to make a fuU 

 trial of its veracity, as they pro- 

 fessed themselves of the same opi- 

 nion. But instead of this, they 

 sacrificed Toulon, and its inhabit- 

 ants, to their projected expeditions 

 in the West Indies. He did not 

 however place much couddence in 

 that language: he had experienced 

 the fallacy of similar assertions bjr 

 the adherents to govf-rnment in 

 the colonies, during the American 

 war. Wiiile we possessed Toulon, 

 Lyons was in arms against the Con- 

 vention, and Marseilles in a state- 

 bordering upon insurrection; yet 

 none of their neighbours shewed 

 the least disposition to join them. 

 This proved how little we could 

 depend on assistance from the peo- 

 ple of France in favour of a coun- 

 ter-revoluiion. The delays of mi- 

 nisters in fitting out the expedition 

 intended for the coast of France, 

 under Lord Moira, to succour the 

 royalists ; and the feeble efforts 

 made in their behalf at Toulon, 

 had convinced them that we were 

 not able to bring them effectual 

 relief; and that they ought not, 

 therefore, to trust in our promises. 

 In the m^an time.all these attempts 

 tended to widen the breach be- 

 tween Great Britain and France, 

 and to kindle a spirit of inveteracy 

 productive of great evils to both 

 countries. Peace, however, was not 

 so diflBcuIt an object to attain aa 

 some people injagined, or ati'ected 

 to believe. The French and Eng- 

 lish had more than once be^-n in- 

 volved in the deadliest quarrels. 

 France had strove, with all her 

 might, to impose an arbitrary go- 

 vernment on this country, to sub- 

 vert its religion, and to replace a 

 banished familv oa the throne. 

 P ' ' These 



