ANNUAL REGISTER, 1794. 221 



'■irm the TTiomeni we became ob- 

 • cts of suspicion : and tins we 

 » ould not fail to become, froai the 

 plans in our contemplation, and 

 'tkc means we possessed to execnte 

 -them. Spain would not content- 

 -edlv behold our fi^fcts seizing ihe 

 ' Frencli islards in the West Indies. 

 The high handwitii \Tiiit;h we forced 

 ; a trade on their coasts, — their re- 

 membrance ot tiie late quarrel about 

 • Nootka Snuiid,— tlie disapproba- 

 tion they expressed at our taking 

 ■ possession at Toulon of a ship of 

 one hundred and ten guos, to vvjiich 

 -they thougiit themselves preferably 

 a«ntitled, as the nearest protectors 

 of tlie Bourboih family, — these were 

 likely soon to induce that power to 

 Jook upon us with an invidious 

 .eye. Prussia and A»atria were such 

 caturalcotnpetitors, that they could 

 not long be expected to rcma n 

 cordially united. Austria could not 

 be aggrandized but to the detri- 

 ment of Prussia: this power was 

 -viewed by all the inferior princes 

 . and states in Germany, as their na- 

 tural protector against the long 

 standing ambition of the House of 

 ^iuitria. Were Pruiiia and the 

 "iesser Germanic powers oppres;ed 

 by Austria, it would give laws to 

 all Europe. The Austrian politics 

 aimed st a monopoly of power, to- 

 tally inconsistent with the interest 

 of zts present ajlies, v\ ho therefore 

 placed no coniidcnce in tlie impe,- 

 ifial nDiniitry, Had iti Ijite designs 

 on Bavaria succeeded, the Emperor 

 vvoiJd have become absolute master 

 -f Germany: but were the courts 

 of Vienna and Berlin subskautially 

 .r^jonected, it c.iu'd be. to no otlier 

 end than to di\idf? the empire be- 

 tween thorn, as they had done Po- 

 land ; in which case the danger to 

 2:.urupeuu freedom would be much 



greater than from the power ani 

 ambition of .France. 



All these considerations provec} 

 how Httle Great Britain could de- 

 pend on the stability of her foreign 

 connexions, and lio\v much reasoa 

 the branch.'s of the coalition Inid 

 to hold each other in constant sus- 

 picion. An alliance between pow^ 

 ers thus sirnnted could not last, nor 

 be ar. object of mucli terror to 

 the French. While we were !)usv- 

 ing ourselves with the affairs of this 

 nation, we Lad suffered a power 

 to aggrandize itself, already much 

 too potent for the welfare of Eu- 

 rope, e.'^pecially the north, where 

 its influence amounted almost to a 

 sovereignty ; we had suffered this 

 mighty power, in deliar.ce of every 

 maxim of common prudence, to 

 seize all the eastern provinces of 

 Poland, countries aboimding with 

 all the necessaries of hfe and ma,- 

 terials of commerce, watered by 

 large and navigable rivers, and peo- 

 pled by near *,0CO,000 of inhabit- 

 ants. By such an acquisition Oc- 

 zacow, a place of little consequence 

 before, was now rendered of the 

 most important value to Russia- 

 Here armaments could be fitted 

 out, and supplied from its neigh.- 

 bourhood vvith all the appurtenain 

 ces of war. Hence an attack could 

 with facility be made on Constan- 

 tinople itself, and the Turkish em- 

 pire in Europe be aniiihilated bc- 

 tore the European powers, interest- 

 ed in its preservation, could have 

 time to prepare for its defence. 

 An aUiance with this formidable 

 power might appear useful in the 

 present plan of confederating every- 

 where for thcsubjugationof France ; 

 but no faiili could be placed in 

 Russian promisesof assistance. The 

 policy of that court was, to encou- 

 rage 



