222 ANNUAL REGISTER, 1794. 



ra^e all the southern powers to 

 unite for the extermination of the 

 French, and to wait till th^y were 

 so exhausted by thi.'ir fruitless ef- 

 forts, as to be utterly unable to 

 impede the Rur-sian schemes. The 

 resources of that Empire, from its 

 immensity, nnd the abundance and 

 variety of its produ.tions in so 

 many different climates, could, with 

 no more than tolerable manage- 

 ment, be n^ndcred fully sufficient 

 for all the proj'^cts it had in view ; 

 the obvious interest of all Europe 

 required bounds to be set to the 

 rapacity of Russia. Great Britain 

 had ample reason to look upon it 

 in no friendly liffht. Its hostile in- 

 terference in the American war, 

 tiader the treacherous pretext of 

 an armed neutrality, shewed what 

 t'lis country had to expect from 

 Russia, whenever occurrences were 

 favourable to its insatiable thirst for 

 domitiion, and its ambitious pre- 

 tences to extend its influence into 

 every par', of Europe. 



In addition to the support to be 

 derived from Rursia, Holland had 

 frequently been mentioned as an 

 ally of undeniable weight in the 

 present combination against France. 

 But what iielp had been afforded 

 to t>s from that t|uarter ? The 

 Dutch, it was well known, had 

 been forced into this quanel against 

 their consent; and was it to be ex- 

 pected thtv would Join us with 

 heart and hand in a contest wherein 

 they had wished to stand neuter ? 

 Our behaviour tended rather to 

 make them our secret enenu'es. 

 They indirectly refused all naval 

 aid, by a spontaneous neglect of 

 their mariiic. Far differently had 

 they acted when fighting at diffei-- 

 pnt_ periods against France and 

 Spain : but then they were acting- 



for themselves, and not compelled 

 to sacrifice themselves for others, 

 Sardinia loo was held up as an ally 

 of utility, by the position of the 

 Italian territories : but experience 

 daily shewed that the King of Sar- 

 dinia, instead of being able to at- 

 tack the French, was reduced to 

 the necesoity of depending on the 

 subsidies of Great Britain for his 

 own defence. These various allies 

 were united by no precise and de- 

 cided principle of action ; tiieir in- 

 terests were too much at variance 

 to permit cordiality and confidence 

 among them. France was undoubt- 

 edly an object of ambition to the 

 principals in the Confederacy : to 

 share in the spoils of such a state, 

 some risk they were not imwilling 

 to incur. Cut were the secondary 

 members of this great coalition to 

 receive any benefit from an aug- 

 mentation of power in the leading 

 heads? Was (ireat Britain itst If, 

 in the present circumstances of 

 those whom we styled our friends, 

 authorized to look for that indem- 

 nification of our tor's and expen- 

 ces which, by increasing the com- 

 mercial gr;indeur of tills country, 

 would necessarily pi ice it nn a more 

 formidable footing thnn was com- 

 patible with the secret, though not 

 iiTi perceptible views of the princi- 

 pal powers iu the coalition ? Thi^ 

 \asi; body, unable to support itself, 

 cliallenged, as it were, a right to 

 throw its weight on the strenoth 

 andopulenceof thiscountry. Hence 

 it claimed and demanded supplies, 

 as if they were a tribute fairly due 

 to its exertions in oirr favour. Im 

 the mean time we demeaned our*- 

 selves to the inferior powers, as ifl 

 we thought them bomnd to be sub-- 

 servient to the measures of Great! 

 Britain. Ilie courts of Sweden 



and 



