HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



22i 



^)f our attention than the greatest 

 j)cssible value of their richest 

 island. Eiit fur what determinate 

 object was the war continued ? 

 Ministers havlrpr left the public 

 ■in the daik respecting their real 

 views, the only method pf difco- 

 vering thcnt was, to examine the 

 manifestoes published at several 

 tlirfes, by those who commanded 

 the armies or fleets of the different 

 poiweis enga;^cd in tiic coalition ; 

 and which bcinjr formally addressed 

 to the French nation, might very 

 re?^onably be supposed to con- 

 tain the objects piopused by the 

 conftderacy. 



In t'le two manifestoes of the 

 Duke of Bruuswick ; in that of 

 (reneral Wurmser ;ind of Prir.ce 

 ■Cobourg ; in those of Lord Hood, 

 •Admiral Langara and General 

 O'Hara, — no clear and distinct 

 idea was held forth connectedly 

 through the whole of thtm takjin 

 together j tliey inculcated absolute 

 power and unlimited obedience ; 

 but there is not one which did 

 not either contradict itself, or 

 which was not contra-dieted by 

 another ; or which had not been 

 entirely disregarded, in the con- 

 duct of those by whom they had 

 'been Issued. Thus the real object 

 of the war, and the conditions ou 

 which the coalition would make 

 peace, had never been explicitly 

 Tnentioned. The knowledge of 

 ■both being necessary for either 

 peace or war, the Throne ought 

 to be petitioned, to make them 

 equally known for the satisfaction 

 of the public. A precedent ex- 

 isted in history applicable to the 

 present state of things in France. 

 A French monarch, Lewis IX., 

 had interposed in the quarrel be- 

 tween our Henry III. and hi* peo- 

 ple, in the character of a tricadly 

 Vou, XXXVl. 



mediator, and had succeeded in 

 effeccmg a reconciliation. Such 

 ought to have been the interposi- 

 tion of Great Britain. Were we 

 at th.e present hour to shew a dis- 

 position to lay aside a hostile spirit, 

 and to admit sentiments of friend- 

 ship and generosity towards the 

 French, we should meet with an 

 adequate return. Interest and in- 

 clination had, from the commence* 

 ment of their troubles, prompted 

 them to wish ardently for a good 

 ujnderst;infling with this countrj. 

 But the evil genius of invective 

 and detraction had unhappily taken 

 possession of both people. To 

 this ihould be attributed the dread- 

 ful cal.nmities that f illowed. It 

 was time however to advert to ths 

 situation in which we stood. The 

 loss of one battle would, in aU 

 likelihood, decide the fate of the 

 coalition ; but the French mighL 

 lose several without being disabledo 

 From the numbers of their peo- 

 ple and the enthusiastic fury that 

 animated them against their ene- 

 micF, their armies would always be 

 supplied with nuifierous recruits ; 

 while the confederates, fighting at 

 a great distance from their respec- 

 tive countries, would suffer a con- 

 stant dinninution both from their 

 victories and defeats, which it 

 would be Impossible to repair. 

 The consequences would be, that 

 ultimately the French would re- 

 main in such force, that the allies 

 would no longer be able to con- 

 front it. — The Marquis concluded, 

 his speech by saying that he had 

 not laid these various arguments 

 and reasonings before the House 

 in the liope that they would produce 

 an immediate effect ; but solely 

 that they might be taken into con- 

 sideration. He would ho\yevcr 

 move an address to his Majesty, 



